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The Bobsled Controversy and 
Squaw Valley’s Olympic Winter Games
Wanda Wakefi eld — USA
On February 15, 1959, Art Tyler piloted a four-man bobsled team from the United States to a World Championship at St. Moritz.1 Yet even as Tyler, the 1956 Olympic bronze medalist,2 celebrated his great victory with his teammates, he and they must surely have lamented the 
serious blow that the American bobsled program – and indeed the whole of sliding sports – had already 
suffered due to the decision by the Organizing Committee for the 1960 Olympic Winter Games at 
Squaw Valley not to build a bobsled run. Despite the promises proponents of the Squaw Valley Games 
made in 1955 to provide competition in each of the four major winter sports,3 in September, 1957, orga-
nizers asked for, and received, permission from the International Olympic Committee to abandon their 
plans to build a run. In doing so they set back the development of the sliding sports in the United States 
by two decades, and failed to take advantage of a growing desire by budding athletes to explore new 
sports. As John Morgan, Executive Producer for FIBT-TV, recently explained, “[having a bobsled track 
in California would have] launched the sport to those crazy Californians who were then surfi ng along 
with inventing skateboarding and in general, the fi rst of extreme sports themes.”4
That the sport of bobsled in the United States was specifi cally damaged by the failure to construct a 
new track in California for 1960, can be demonstrated by examining the American sliders’ results in the 
years before the Squaw Valley Games and after. For example, bobsledders from the United States had 
medaled numerous times in previous Olympics, including the 1956 Games at Cortina d’Ampezzo. No 
American bobsledders would win Olympic medals again until the 2002 Olympic Winter Games at Salt 
Lake City. Moreover, after the 1961 World Bobsled Championships, held at Lake Placid, only three other 
American bobsled teams would win medals in international competition again until 1996. That lack of 
international success cannot, of course, be attributed solely to the fact that no bobsled run was built on 
the West Coast. Bobsled and other sports, such as the sliding sport of luge, were also disadvantaged in 
international competition by the lack of fi nancial and practical support from their American governing 
body, the AAU. Indeed, the lack of success of American athletes due to ongoing feuds between the 
NCAA and AAU over control of sports in the United States ultimately led to the enactment of the Ama-
teur Sports Act of 1978, which required each individual sport to have its own, governing body.5
In any event, the international bobsledding community protested the Squaw Valley decision in the 
strongest possible terms, and in a variety of venues, and fought for a year to have bobsled competitions 
restored to the 1960 Olympic program. Then, when that failed, they supported the effort by the village 
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of Lake Placid, which had a working bobsled run dating from the 1932 Olympics, to move the bobsled 
races to New York state. The IOC also rejected that idea and bobsledders remain bitter about the 1960 
situation to this day.6 
In 1957, the Squaw Valley Organizing Committee (SVOC) asked to eliminate bobsled due to what 
it said was the expense of construction and the likelihood that too few nations would enter sleds in the 
competition to justify the cost. The International Olympic Committee, headed by its President, Avery 
Brundage, and Chancellor, Otto Mayer, clearly accepted these arguments. They also, in the years be-
tween 1957 and 1960, refused to entertain ideas for alternative venues in which the competitions might 
have been held. Why did they do so? Was there something specifi c about bobsled that earned their 
scorn? Was there something about the winter sports in general to which Brundage and Mayer objected? 
And would the decision to eliminate bobsled races at the 1960 Olympic Winter Games have been dif-
ferent if the bob run had been another fi eld on which to fi ght the Cold War? The purpose of this paper 
is to suggest answers to these questions.
In the spring of 1955, Squaw Valley was awarded the 1960 Olympic Winter Games by a 32-30 vote 
over a strong bid from Innsbruck, Austria.7 At that time, the SVOC pledged that they would be able to 
build up their proposed venue from a “picnic ground” to a world-class sports destination, which would 
provide facilities for the four major winter sports on time and within their proposed budget.8 In later 
years, bobsled supporters involved with the IOC would argue that they would never have supported 
the California bid without the assurance that sliding would be included on the program. And, indeed, 
at fi rst no one had any reason to doubt that that would be so. On October 4, 1955, Alexander Cushing, 
who shortly would be forced out of his position as head of the Squaw Valley organizing committee, 
advised IOC President Brundage that preliminary plans for the bobsled track had already been approved 
by the Fédération Internationale de Bobsleigh et Tobagganing (FIBT).9 And at the end of the year, in 
an article in the Nevada State-Journal describing the state of Olympic Planning, IOC Chancellor Otto 
Mayer explained that the French designer, Louis Saint-Cailbre had been contacted to draw up plans for 
the bobsled track.10
The following year most of those interested in the sliding sports would have continued to believe that 
they were going to have an opportunity for world-class competition at Squaw Valley. On February 3, 
1956, Avery Brundage wrote to Count Rene de Fregeoliere, President of the International Bobsled Fed-
eration, about various technical specifi cations for the bob run.11 Meanwhile, the new head of the Squaw 
Valley committee, Prentis Hale, advised Otto Mayer that Saint-Cailbre was proceeding with his designs.12 
Finally, in October, 1956, both Count de Fregeoliere and Albert Mayer, Vice President of the FIBT, were 
invited to join the leaders of other international sports organizations to tour the Squaw Valley site.13
The following year Squaw Valley planners continued to prepare for bobsled competitions. With re-
gard to the dates for the 1960 Olympic Winter Games, Alan Bartholemy, Secretary of the SVOC, wrote 
to Marc Hodler of the FIS, that starting later in February, 1960 would be better for the proposed refrig-
erated bob track.14 And, on March 19, 1957, apparently anticipating no change in plans, Otto Mayer 
assured Bartholemy that representatives from Squaw Valley did not need to attend the upcoming IOC 
meetings in Sofi a, Bulgaria.15
Nevertheless, there are indications that bobsled was already being considered for elimination from 
the program by the IOC. In 1954, the IOC voted to replace skeleton (which had been contested only 
at St. Moritz) with luge as an Olympic sport. Luge then split from FIBT with the establishment of a new 
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governing body, the Fédération Internationale de Luge de Course (FIL).16 Apparently, Otto Mayer and 
Avery Brundage began to wonder about the inclusion of luge in the 1960 program almost immediately 
thereafter. In a series of letters from Mayer to Brundage in April, 1957, Mayer described the large num-
ber of Europeans participating in luge, emphasized the amateur status of those athletes and suggested 
the addition of luge.17 Although, in those letters, Mayer never suggested that bobsled be replaced by 
luge, his emphasis on the large number of competitive luge athletes must surely have been intended 
to catch Brundage’s attention, as during the subsequent fi ght with bobsled over its exclusion from the 
Olympic program, Brundage consistently argued that there were simply too few bobsledders in the 
world to justify the sport’s continuation as an Olympic sport. 
On June 17, 1957, Otto Mayer contacted Alan Bartholmey, and, despite his earlier advice, now 
urged that Bartholemy or another Squaw Valley representative make the trip to Sofi a.18 Bartholemy 
responded that there was no money in the budget for such a trip. Two weeks later, on July 1, 1957 Bar-
tholemy provided the proposed 1960 competition schedule to Count de Fregeolière.19 As of August 13, 
1957, a tentative program for Squaw Valley also included the dates for bobsled racing. 
Then, with no apparent advance notice,20 during the IOC meetings at Sofi a from September 23 
to September 28, the Squaw Valley committee received the IOC’s permission to abandon their plans 
to build a bobsled run. The minutes of that Sofi a meeting show that the IOC considered a number of 
matters relevant to the upcoming Olympic Winter Games. They gave provisional permission to partici-
pation by athletes from North Korea, so long as they competed as part of a joint Korean team – a plan 
similar to that followed with regard to German Olympic athletes who competed as part of a unifi ed 
team until 1968.21 The IOC also accepted the promise by the United States government that athletes and 
offi cials from every nation would be admitted to the country in February, 1960, even if they represented 
a country with which the United States had no diplomatic relations. Furthermore, those athletes and 
offi cials would be exempted from any fi ngerprinting requirements.22
The IOC members then proceeded to consider the elimination or addition of sports in future Olym-
pic games. They accepted the request by the Italian Olympic Committee to eliminate running deer from 
shooting competitions for the Summer Games scheduled for Rome in 1960. And “on the recommenda-
tion of the Organizing Committee and in agreement with Mr. Albert Mayer, Vice-President of the Bob-
sleigh International Federation” they decided to exclude bobsled while reserving the right to reconsider 
the matter should 12 national federations advise the Olympic organizers that they would like to race at 
Squaw Valley.23 
 During the discussion about eliminating certain sports, Avery Brundage explained his own feelings 
about the matter. According to Brundage, since sports such as football, cycling, basketball and water 
polo did not follow the rules of amateurism they should be removed from the summer games. Similarly, 
in his view, fi gure skating was irreparably tarnished with professionalism and should be eliminated. 
Brundage also said that a sport that has been consistently mismanaged should be considered for elimi-
nation. Signifi cantly, at Sofi a, in explaining why he believed certain sports should be removed from the 
Olympic program, and immediately following the decision to exclude bobsled, Brundage did not cite 
the reasons for not providing a bobsled competition – that building the track would be too expensive, 
and that few countries proposed to send sleds – in explaining why he believed certain sports should be 
taken off the Olympic program.24
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In subsequent months, representatives of the FIBT, trying to restore the bobsled competition, strug-
gled to counter the constantly shifting justifi cations for the Sofi a decision, while responding to Brund-
age’s concerns about professionalism and mismanagement in Olympic sports. 
When the Squaw Valley Organizing Committee approached the IOC in September, 1957, asking 
that their obligation to build a bobsled track be waived, they cited the results of a survey allegedly sent 
to the National Olympic committees of those countries in the past, which had participated in bobsled 
competitions. They reported to the IOC that of those countries surveyed, only two, the United States 
and Romania, had said that they would defi nitely participate in 1960.25 Almost immediately representa-
tives of bobsledding interests in various European nations began to counter the idea that they were not 
planning to send sleds to the Olympics. As Otto Mayer reported to Prentis Hale in October, the Italian, 
Swiss and German Olympic committees were all quite angry at the decision.26 Moreover, on October 9, 
1957, Giordano B. Fabjan, of the Italian Olympic Committee wrote to Prentis Hale that Italy had totally 
misunderstood the signifi cance of the survey – which he admitted they had received. Fabjan asserted 
that in responding to the Squaw Valley questionnaire, they had assumed that Squaw Valley merely 
wanted to know the number of sleds that would be entered in the competition, not whether Italy would 
participate at all. Since the Italians did not know for sure in 1957 whether they would be entering only 
one or two sleds in both the two and four man bob races, they had answered only that they would 
“probably” be racing in 1960.27 
Certainly, the Squaw Valley organizers had an interest in knowing how many sleds any individual 
country might send as they were in the process of deciding how large to make the sled storage shed. 
However, it was not at all clear at the time what the Olympic rules required in terms of country/team 
participation for an event to go forward – nor was it clear that the rules applying to the summer sports 
should apply to the Winter Games. The IOC had established a Rule 30, which required a minimum 
number of 12 participants, but that rule had not been followed in Melbourne – or, for that matter, at 
Cortina where neither hockey nor fi gure skating met the minimum number of participating countries 
required of bobsled.28 Because the Rule was apparently not working to defi ne an appropriate level of 
entrants to any competition, the IOC Executive Board at its June, 1957 meeting in Evian, France, dis-
cussed revising the rule while maintaining its purpose.29 As revised, that rule limited inclusion in the 
Olympics to only those sports “widely practiced” in 25 or more countries.30 Even assuming “wide prac-
tice” or a “minimum of 12 countries” was necessary for competition in an individual sport to be held at 
the Olympics, as Godfrey Dewey, President of the 1932 Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee, 
noted, team sports had never been required to meet that number. And bobsled was certainly a team 
sport. Moreover, as Dewey reminded Brundage, “The arbitrary requirement of virtual commitments 
from 12 nations two years in advance of the Games as a condition for requiring the Organizing Com-
mittee to keep faith seems to me to be totally unrealistic as well as unreasonable.”31
As various European bobsledders fought the Sofi a decision, the AAU, governing body for bobsled in 
the United States, also began to look for ways to ensure the presence of the sliding sports on the 1960 
program. The AAU’s secretary, Dan Ferris, fi rst asked Otto Mayer to consider moving the races to Lake 
Placid. He also asked whether the 12 nation standard applied to bobsledding because it was a team 
sport. Mayer replied that there would be no bobsledding in New York in 1960, and that the IOC’s Sofi a 
decision required the participation of 12 countries, not teams.32 However, Ferris was apparently con-
vinced that if the FIBT could provide Squaw Valley with the names of twelve nations sworn to compete, 
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the organizers would still be able to build a bobsled run before the Games began. Douglas F. Roby, Vice 
President of the U.S. Olympic committee, also spoke out, advising Alan Bartholemy in December of 
1957 not to consider the matter closed just yet.33 Unfortunately, the arguments of both Ferris and Roby 
were rejected by Brundage who wrote Roby at the end of the year that there simply were not enough 
bobsledders in the world to make bobsledding an Olympic sport. Brundage also rejected the com-
plaints by Count de Fregeolière that there was something “underhanded” in the relationship between 
the IOC and Squaw Valley concerning the bobsled situation.34
Meanwhile the FIBT prepared for its annual meeting in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, scheduled for 
January, 1958. At that point the Federation knew that construction on the bobsled run had not begun. 
They also knew that the IOC had imposed a requirement that they get assurances from 12 countries that 
they would defi nitely come to Squaw Valley. During the meeting, the FIBT and John E. Morgan, from the 
AAU bobsled committee, determined that at least 10 countries wished to participate, including the tra-
ditional powers Italy, Switzerland, Austria and Germany. The FIBT also decided at that meeting to help 
the Squaw Valley committee reduce the cost of construction by agreeing that the Olympic races could 
be conducted at night, eliminating the need to refrigerate the track.35 Apparently, Alan Bartholemy was 
pleased with the FIBT’s offer to hold night races because he wrote to Louis Saint-Cailbre in March that 
he would need to make modifi cations in his plans to allow for an unrefrigerated track. 36 
In the meantime, the FIBT also asked national Olympic organizing committees to let Squaw Valley 
know that they intended to come to the Games. The Italians did so in October, 1957, and were joined 
by the Swiss and the Germans by the middle of April the following year.37 The British, too, sent a letter 
to the organizers explaining that they could not say for certain that they would send sleds, but only be-
cause the committee governing the 1960 British Olympic teams would not be established until 1959.38 
However, Belgium formally said they would not participate, and Brundage reported to Prentis Hale in 
April that he had heard the Canadians would not be sliding.39
At their Tokyo meeting, in May of 1958, the IOC honored their 1957 Sofi a agreement to revisit their 
decision to exclude bobsled. A Squaw Valley representative reported, once more, that too few nations 
had replied positively to their query to justify the construction of the bob run. But at that meeting the 
French delegate announced that he had been authorized by his national committee to say that France, 
as well, wanted to compete in bobsled.40 That would have meant that at least six nations were positively 
on board for the Games, with Britain most likely to compete. But clearly the FIBT had not been able to 
fi nd 12 nations willing to formally commit to bobsledding in 1960, and referring back to the old Rule 30, 
the IOC confi rmed its Sofi a decision.
After that vote there was virtually no chance that Squaw Valley could host an Olympic bobsled 
competition in 1960, but the argument about who was responsible for that result continued. Count de 
Fregeolière wrote Brundage on June 3, 1958, reminding him of how the FIBT had agreed at Garmisch 
to forgo a pre-Olympic test event and to have the races at night on an unrefrigerated track. Given that 
unprecedented willingness to cooperate with the organizing committee’s need to limit costs, the Count 
wondered why bobsled alone had to meet standards that other Olympic sports did not.41 Later in 1958 
he wrote Brundage that he and the FIBT would certainly never have supported Squaw Valley’s bid had 
they not had assurance that there would be bobsledding in 1960. And the Count challenged Brundage 
to explain why he had acquiesced in the matter at Sofi a – was he merely a “servile factotum” for the 
Squaw Valley Organizing Committee?42 Certainly Brundage rejected the notion that he was a servile 
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factotum. He also suggested to the Count that all of his complaints were without merit given the fact that 
the FIBT’s own Vice President,Albert Mayer, had been at Sofi a and had supported the decision.43 After 
that particular exchange of letters the Count de Fregeolière apparently left further negotiations about 
Olympic bobsled in the hands of others.
One group still trying to provide for bobsledding in 1960 was located in Lake Placid. Under the 
leadership of Godfrey Dewey they reminded Brundage that they had a perfectly good bob run in use 
since World War II – at least once for a World Championships. The former bobsledding World Cham-
pion Stanley Benham queried the bobsledding nations if they would come to Lake Placid in 1960 to 
race if they were assured those races would count as “Olympic.” Benham announced in March, 1959, 
that he had obtained promises from nine nations that they would come to Lake Placid under those cir-
cumstances, and fi ve other countries were likely to send sleds.44 Nevertheless, Brundage remained fi rm 
in his opinion that there was simply too little support for bobsled in the United States and around the 
world for its inclusion on the 1960 program. Furthermore, Otto Mayer argued that despite the fact that 
in 1956 the equestrian events had been held in Stockholm, Sweden, rather than Melbourne, Australia, 
no precedent was created for dividing responsibility for conducting Olympic competitions among two 
or more cities. Nor had the recent decision to move the 1960 yachting events from Rome to Naples 
changed his mind. Rather both Brundage and Mayer believed that these exceptions did not alter the 
basic rule that all events in any Olympiad must be conducted within the bid winning community.45
So, there was to be no bobsled in 1960. But why? Clearly the Squaw Valley Organizing Committee 
remained committed to its theory that the cost would be prohibitive and that too few nations would be 
likely to compete were a bob run to be constructed. Yet asking the IOC at Sofi a to cancel the competi-
tion based on that explanation seems inadequate.46 Were there other factors that played into the IOC’s 
decision? Apparently so.
As Avery Brundage was quick to point out on many occasions, the Olympic Winter Games them-
selves had been almost an afterthought, which had never had the support of the Count Pierre de Cou-
bertin.47 As Brundage noted, de Coubertin’s Olympic vision presupposed competitions in sports that 
were – or had the potential to be – widely practiced. Moreover, de Coubertin consistently supported the 
idea that Olympians should be strictly amateurs – a principle to which Brundage adhered until the end 
of his life. Therefore, as Brundage argued as early as 1936, including “professional” fi gure skaters on an 
Olympic program violated the basic ideals of the Movement. Brundage even argued that Sonia Henie 
should be barred from competition at Garmisch because it was “well-known” that she was supporting 
her parents with her skating – and this before Henie went to Hollywood to begin a prosperous fi lm ca-
reer.48 Brundage continued to fi ght the presence of professional athletes in the Olympic Winter Games 
until 1972, supporting the decision to ban the Austrian skier Karl Schranz from the Games at Sapporo for 
accepting sponsorship money from the manufacturer of his skis.49 Since Brundage was convinced that 
the four major winter sports of the 1950s (bobsled, skating, skiing and hockey) were in violation of the 
amateur rules, then it seems possible that he and Chancellor Mayer seized on the chance to eliminate 
the least professionalized winter sport from the program as a means toward eliminating the Olympic 
Winter Games altogether. As Marc Hodler, President of the FIS, told the Zurich newspaper, Sport, he 
had been told by Otto Mayer that if the international winter sports federations were to ask for the abo-
lition of the Olympic Winter Games, the IOC would be “delighted.”50 Later, Brundage expressed the 
hope that the 1972 Games in Sapporo would be the last as with regard to the Olympic Winter Games, 
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“I doubt very much that they will remain.”51 Finally, Brundage agreed with David, Marquess of Exeter, 
in his 1971 assessment that bobsled at the very least should be an optional part of the Olympic program 
because bobsled “clearly cannot claim to rank as an Olympic event … I should have thought that the 
guillotine would have fallen on it in any event under our latest change of rules.”52
Beyond the IOC’s desire to destroy the Olympic Winter Games, international bobsled offi cials had a 
special political challenge to face in 1960. Since the return of the Soviet Union to Olympic competition 
in 1952, the success of their athletes had been pointed to as proof of the superiority of their system. With 
the Cold War growing ever more intense during the decade, the United States and its allies also began 
to see athletic success as one key to winning the hearts and minds of the people of countries, which had 
not yet chosen a side in the ongoing confl ict. In other words, the Olympic Games became another zone 
where the confl ict could be fought in relative peace. Thus, Hungarian anger and frustration at the Soviets 
for putting down their 1956 rebellion was expressed in the water polo pool in Melbourne after it was 
no longer safe to do so on the streets of Budapest. Similarly, the Soviet hockey team’s success at Cortina 
provided another indication that the Communist state was capable of producing a strong set of players 
in a very short time should they choose to do so.53
In the years leading up to Squaw Valley, the organizers struggled to accommodate the demands 
of U.S. foreign policy with their responsibility to open Olympic competition to everyone. Alexander 
Cushing had promised during the 1955 bid process that all athletes, whether or not they came from 
a country with which the United States had diplomatic relations, would be welcomed onto American 
shores. His successors on the Squaw Valley Organizing Committee reiterated that pledge and used their 
political infl uence to gain the State Department’s agreement to facilitate the visa process in 1960.54 And 
when the Games ended, most Americans saw the U.S. hockey team’s victory over the favored Soviets 
as evidence that their country was number one. 
The political problem for bobsled in this Cold War climate was that the Soviet Union had yet to 
develop a sliding sports program. Indeed, the USSR Bobsledding Federation would not be created until 
1969.55 With no Soviet bobsled team in the picture, the Cold War might still have been signifi cant had 
the two Germanies been competing separately. However, both the Federal Republic and the Democrat-
ic Republic of Germany were committed to sending a joint team to Squaw Valley.56 Therefore, when the 
Germans advised that they would like to compete in the bobsled in 1960, there was no chance that a 
German success could be construed as evidence of the excellence of the GDR’s system. In other words, 
when the IOC decided to eliminate bobsled there was no effort by the Eastern Bloc states to change 
that decision because they simply had no reason to care. On the other hand, had Squaw Valley tried to 
eliminate the new sport of biathlon from the program there would surely have been major complaints 
and serious political pressure exerted by the Soviet Union and its allies to prevent that as they expected 
to do well on the skiing and shooting range in 1960.
Although only nine countries sent competitors to the 1960 Olympic biathlon competition, biathlon 
was safe from Olympic elimination because the Soviet Union would never have chosen to give up the 
chance for Olympic medals.57 Although other Olympic sports had in the past had fewer than 12 nations 
competing they, too, were safe in 1960 from being removed from the program. In the end only bobsled 
was charged with being too costly and having too few athletes to justify its inclusion on the Olympic 
program. Constructing a bobrun in Squaw Valley might have seemed to be too expensive in 1960, but 
the long-term costs to the sliding sports are incalculable. Had the FIBT been able to change the Sofi a de-
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cision to eliminate the sport surely more athletes and more money would have been invested in bobsled. 
But the FIBT was unable to do so because of the long-running desire by Avery Brundage to eliminate the 
Olympic Winter Games altogether and because, when the IOC made its decision, the FIBT was unable 
to rely on the Cold War support of the Soviet bloc.
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A Persistent Desire: An Account of 
Buenos Aires’ Efforts to Host the Olympic Games
Cesar R. Torres — USA
Throughout the twentieth century, Argentine elites have attempted to prove that their country has adopted the tenets of modern civilization. Their attempts included projecting an image of Buenos Aires as a South American enclave in which Western ideals fl ourished. It is no coincidence then 
that despite Argentina’s troubled history of serious political, economic and social crises, those elites 
coveted hosting the Olympic Games in Buenos Aires on many occasions. The last concerted effort was 
the bid for the 2004 Olympics, ultimately awarded to and successfully staged by Athens. Buenos Aires 
was the only South American city among the fi ve fi nalists, a fact that many porteños1 took as a testa-
ment to the distinctiveness of their city. During the weeks before the election of the host for the 2004 
Olympics in September 1997, the prospect of an Olympic Buenos Aires was a recurrent topic of discus-
sion in Argentine society. The history of Buenos Aires’ attempts to host the Olympic Games, however, 
was hardly mentioned.
Given that offi cials on the Buenos Aires 2004 bid committee frequently advanced that Argentina has a 
long and distinguished record of involvement in the Olympic Movement, including several efforts to bring 
the Olympic Games to Buenos Aires, the absence of reference to these efforts was all the more intrigu-
ing. A close inspection of the Buenos Aires 2004 bid materials reveals that the emphasis on Argentina’s 
Olympic past included broad and vague statements regarding Buenos Aires’ efforts to host the Olympic 
Games. For example, although one bid document stated, “Buenos Aires applies for the fi fth time,”2 no 
details of these applications were provided. The press replicated this kind of statement. For instance, the 
daily La Nación wrote in June 1997, “The enthusiasm to be the host of the Games and the tradition of 
loyalty to the Olympic Movement has become evident in the four previous bids.”3 On the other hand, a 
mid-1970s International Olympic Committee’s (IOC) publication stated that Buenos Aires had already bid 
for the Olympic Games fi ve times.4 Confusingly, a Buenos Aires 2004 bid committee offi cial claimed after 
the bid failed that the city had sought to organize the Olympic Games only four times.5
The absence of specifi cs regarding the city’s efforts to host the Olympic Games in the Buenos Aires 
2004 bid materials might have arisen from the confusion surrounding them and not from a dismissal 
of Olympic history. After all, offi cials in the Buenos Aires 2004 bid committee did not fail to mention 
that an Argentine José B. Zubiaur was among those chosen by Pierre de Coubertin to form the original 
IOC in 1894.6 These offi cials knew that although the historical arguments offered little help in securing 
their bid, the politics of nostalgia and Olympic romanticism warranted the trumpeting of Argentina’s 
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role in regional and global Olympic affairs since Zubiaur’s days. The lacuna surrounding Buenos Aires’ 
attempts to host the Olympic Games begs for historical attention; at the very least to set the record 
straight. More important than merely setting the record straight, the study of these attempts illuminates 
the evolving character of the relationship between politics, sport, and Olympic matters in Argentina 
throughout the twentieth century.
The examination of Buenos Aires’ multiple failed attempts to host the Olympic Games underscores 
complex political processes at play. In doing so, it not only ascertains how many times Buenos Aires 
actually bid to host the Olympic Games but also clarifi es the logic, conditions, and forces that prompted 
sport and governmental offi cials as well as civic leaders to consider the city as a potentially successful 
host and to articulate efforts for an Olympic Buenos Aires. To comprehend the drive behind the ef-
forts for an Olympic Buenos Aires requires the evaluation of the way in which Olympic proponents 
constructed legitimating narratives at both the domestic and international levels to project particular 
representations of Buenos Aires and Argentina. The study of Buenos Aires’ bids also helps explain why 
these efforts eventually failed and assists in discussing whether the city could be an Olympic host in 
the near future.
Early Expressions of Interest
Interest in the Olympic Movement arose in Argentina just a decade after Coubertin in 1894 named 
Zubiaur a founding member of the IOC. However, it was not Zubiaur, who considered sport an educa-
tional tool, but the aristocratic porteños, a group that saw sport participation as a distinctive attribute of 
gentlemen, who promoted Coubertin’s Games and ideology in their country.7 During the early stage of 
Olympic diffusion in Argentina, the idea to bring the Olympic Games to the nation’s capital fi rst found 
expression. A year after the proposal advanced by elite Argentine sporting circles that the government 
subsidize what would have been the fi rst offi cial Olympic delegation to the 1908 London Olympics was 
rejected by Congress, a senator declared his dream that Buenos Aires host the Olympic Games in the 
future.8 Manifesting his admiration for physical exercises, Joaquín V. Gonzalez declared to a session of 
the Senate that 
… their necessity is evident, given the increasing development of these healthy exercises, 
so prestigious in the contemporary world, for they have originated the beautiful institution 
of the universal olympic games, that someday must take place in the city of Buenos Aires, 
thus fulfi lling a national wish that, evidently, is inclined to Games of this kind that will infl u-
ence so much the future of the Nation and the race.9
Gonzalez’s vision of Olympic Games in Buenos Aires came while informing the Senate about a pro-
posed bill that established the festivities projected to commemorate the May 1910 centenary of Ar-
gentina’s revolution for national independence. He lauded the civic virtues of physical exercises, their 
embrace by the Argentine people, and the hope that Buenos Aires one day would serve as host to the 
Olympic Games to justify the construction of “a model house for the practice of physical exercises” that 
would be given to the Club de Gimnasia y Esgrima de Buenos Aires (Buenos Aires Gymnastic and Fenc-
ing Club).10 Although the bill passed, the gymnasium-like building was not built. However, the centen-
nial festivities included an extensive program of international competitions modeled after the Olympic 
Games commonly regarded as the Juegos Olimpícos del Centenario (Centennial Olympic Games).11 
Coubertin, ever the sentinel of everything Olympic, argued that Manuel Quintana, who had replaced 
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Zubiaur in the IOC in 1907, “had used the term ‘Olympic Games’ improperly for personal publicity”12 
and expelled him from the committee shortly after the closing ceremony of the Juegos Olímpicos del 
Centenario. Even if this sport festival was a sign of Argentine commitment to the Olympic Movement 
it did not warrant, at least in Coubertin’s mind, the label Olympic. That word was exclusively reserved 
for his “true” Olympic Games.
After the expulsion of Quintana in 1910, even though he was not replaced until 1922 by a future 
Argentine President, Marcelo T. de Alvear, Argentine sport offi cials tried – unsuccessfully – to send teams 
to the 1912 and 1920 Olympic Games. Early in the 1920s this failure divided the Argentine sport com-
munity inciting complex and problematic attempts to establish an Argentine National Olympic Com-
mittee (NOC) and to secure control and access to sport. The creation of a defi nitive NOC in late 1923, 
orchestrated by Alvear and Ricardo C. Aldao, a distinguished sport offi cial associated with Alvear’s 
ruling party, did not appease all the confrontations raging in Argentine sport but did help dispatch the 
fi rst offi cial Argentine delegation to the 1924 Paris Olympics.13 This precarious stability prompted local 
Olympic offi cials to renew their hopes to organize the “true” Olympic Games. These hopes were once 
again linked to the construction of sport facilities in the premises of the Club de Gimnasia y Esgrima de 
Buenos Aires.
Aldao, who was the President of both the Club de Gimnasia y Esgrima de Buenos Aires and the 
recently created Comité Olímpico Argentino (Argentine Olympic Committee), and had become the 
nation’s second IOC member in 1923, fervently expressed to his IOC colleagues the Argentine desire to 
organize the Olympic Games. He did so the very fi rst time he took part in an IOC session. While lead-
ing the Argentine team to the 1924 Paris Olympics, Aldao reported about the state of sport in his nation 
and gave details of the sport facilities to be erected in his club, which he considered the “oldest and 
most important [institution] of our country.”14 He reported that the Argentine Congress, the government, 
and the municipality of Buenos Aires had agreed to fi nance a Champ des sports that would include a 
stadium for 100,000 spectators.15 After elucidating the specifi cs of the fi nancial arrangements, present-
ing the plans, and even distributing pictures of the works already in progress to the IOC assembly, Aldao 
grandiloquently proclaimed:
By having this considerable and inexhaustible fi nancial resource at its disposal, totally used 
to build the Stadium and its annexes, Argentina will very soon be in a position to accept 
without hesitation, the honor that the Games of one of the next Olympiads be celebrated 
in Buenos Aires.16
The Argentine press replicated Aldao’s announcement. According to La Nación, Aldao went even further 
and declared that the stadium “will soon allow Argentina to be the theater of future Olympic Games.”17 
Interviewed by the same daily, Coubertin, who in all probability had been apprised of the stadium by 
future IOC President Henri de Baillet-Latour the year before,18 declared that he was:
amazed by the goodness and grandiosity of the project. It will be the most complete sport 
facility in the world, an ideal endeavor, my dream for many years. Dr. Aldao has invited 
me to attend its inauguration, in the year 1928; if nothing prevents it, it will be a real plea-
sure to go to Buenos Aires, to be present in that transcendental act and closely appreciate 
the magnifi cent progress of the Argentine people in the area of sports.19
As much as Coubertin praised the Champ des sports and its stadium, the IOC President did not make 
even the feeblest remark to kindle Aldao’s hope that Buenos Aires would soon organize the Olympic 
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Games. In spite of this indicative silence and that the promised massive stadium was nowhere in sight in 
the Buenos Aires’ topography, four years after Coubertin’s remarks Argentine Olympic offi cials renewed 
their proposal to bring the Olympic Games to Argentina’s capital. Rather than a general announcement, 
this time their project had a specifi c date, the 1936 Olympics. Apparently, the Argentines did not need 
much international encouragement for their Olympic dreams.
The Bid for the 1936 Games
According to IOC records, Buenos Aires had already made clear its intention to bid for the 1936 Olym-
pics as early as 1925, but the city did not have plans nor economic guarantees.20 Two years later, the 
city was no longer among the list of candidates,, presumably because it was not supported by its 
government.21 This warning signal was noted in Argentina. In late June of 1928, when the Amsterdam 
Olympics was about to get underway, Aldao wrote to Baillet-Latour on his and President Alvear’s, behalf 
indicating that they wished to nominate Buenos Aires to host the 1936 Olympics. The stadium was a 
recurrent issue, mentioned yet again as one of the main attraction of the proposal. For instance, in his 
letter Aldao insisted:
For this period, our Capital will be in a position to count with the Camp de Jeux currently 
being built, an important part of which is already functional. We will then have at our 
disposition a stadium that can host 100,000 spectators.22
By then, however, Aldao and Alvear had learned, perhaps from having witnessed for a few years how the 
IOC conducted its affairs regarding future Olympic hosts, that a high-profi le stadium was not the only 
element needed to impress the committee’s members. This time the Argentine Olympic hopefuls assured 
Baillet-Latour that if the IOC accepted their proposal the Argentine government would take the necessary 
measures “to expedite the requirements of the Delegates and Sportsmen with respect to their travel and 
their stay in Argentina.”23 Baillet-Latour was delighted with such a generous offer coming directly from 
Argentina’s President. The IOC President acknowledged receipt of the bid while Aldao was informed 
that no decision would be made before 1931.24 However, early in 1929, Aldao insisted that the IOC 
considers his earlier proposal if that year’s IOC session would take up the host of the 1936 Olympics, 
noting that “all necessary elements for the celebration of the XIth. Olympiad will be available by then” 
in Buenos Aires.25 Anxious for a sign, Aldao indicated to Baillet-Latour once again in April of 1929 that 
Buenos Aires wanted to host those Games and remarked that the grand stadium would be ready in 1932. 
He also mentioned that whatever the transportation diffi culties from Europe to Argentina, they would be 
taken care of by the Comité Olímpico Argentino (Argentine Olympic Committee), which was backed by 
the Argentine government.26 Although Alvear’s presidential term expired in 1928, Hipólito Yrigoyen, a 
member of his party, won the election to succeed him, which presumably provided political continuity 
for the project.27
When the IOC met in Berlin for its annual session in May of 1930, Buenos Aires was among the 
candidates to host the 1936 Olympics.28 Aldao attended the session. Despite seeing Buenos Aires as a 
candidate for the Games, he was disturbed by what he experienced in Germany. He was displeased 
with the policy adopted by the IOC regarding amateurism that opposed the principle of “broken time.” 
However, he was even more enraged with the method that the IOC leadership had used to approve it. 
Aldao claimed that IOC members were forced to vote the way the ruling cabal wanted and that he was 
not given the fl oor to state his ideas.29 Predictably, Baillet-Latour disagreed with Aldao’s views. After the 
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1930 IOC session, both Aldao and Alvear resigned from the committee.30 Their action severed the link 
between the Argentines and the IOC leadership and put Buenos Aires’ bid to host the 1936 Olympics 
on the back burner. When the time to choose such a host came at the April 1931 IOC session held in 
Barcelona, Buenos Aires was not on the list of candidates.31 In the postal vote of Mexican IOC mem-
ber Miguel de Beistegui, Buenos Aires did appear as a possible candidate.32 Even more paradoxically, 
Baillet-Latour asked Aldao and Alvear to cable their votes.33 This might have been a friendly gesture 
indicating that they were welcomed back in the Olympic fold. Ultimately, Berlin was awarded the 1936 
Olympics, and only Alvear refused to rejoin the IOC.34 Alvear’s decision had more to do with the po-
litical developments in Argentina that forced him into exile, preventing him from serving the IOC well, 
than with Aldao’s complaints.35
If the dispute Aldao and Alvear had opened with the IOC leadership had already negatively in-
fl uenced any chance that Buenos Aires had in the race for the 1936 Olympics, a major political crisis 
obliterated the city’s hopes. In September 1930, José F. Uriburu overthrew the democratically elected 
government of President Yrigoyen, becoming Argentina’s fi rst de facto President. Argentina’s politi-
cal institutions were forever affected and life in the nation changed dramatically after the coup.36 In 
spite of the political changes, it was during the fi rst few months of Uriburu’s reign that the Club de 
Gimnasia y Esgrima de Buenos Aires (Buenos Aires Gymnastic and Fencing Club) offi cially opened 
some facilities of its Champ des sports – but not the grand stadium. During the inauguration, attended 
by Uriburu, Aldao thanked a former democratically elected President but not Alvear. He also insisted 
that a 100,000-seat stadium was planned, announcing that it would promptly go to a public bidding 
process and adding that the money available allowed it to be built in twenty months.37 
Shortly after these announcements, infl uential French IOC member Melchior de Polignac visited 
Buenos Aires and praised the work of the Argentine Olympic advocates. Polignac remembered visiting 
“the magnifi cent grounds of the ‘Club de gimnasia y esgrima’ which are probably the best in the world,” 
adding that “This is the perfect model and Mr. Aldao, who has brought this admirable work to fruition, 
merits the thanks of all sportsmen.”38 Polignac’s accolades, like Coubertin’s before, failed to mention any 
prospect of future Olympic Games in Buenos Aires. At the time of Polignac’s visit, the colossal stadium, 
the centerpiece of the project, was still a dream. Unfortunately, it remained so.
The Bid for the 1940 Games
By the time of the 1932 Los Angeles Olympics, the discord between the Argentine IOC members and 
the IOC had dissolved. Aldao was once again active in Olympic matters, Alvear had been replaced by 
Horacio Bustos Morón, then President of the Comité Olímpico Argentino, and Argentina sent a robust 
team to Los Angeles. While athletes competed for Olympic glory under the Californian sun, the IOC held 
its annual session. During IOC deliberations, Baillet-Latour announced the cities wishing to organize the 
1940 Olympics. Buenos Aires made the list. Oddly, all were unoffi cial candidates.39 Three years later, in 
the IOC session held in Oslo, the South American metropolis remained a candidate.40 However, it seems 
that the candidacy was not followed up on in Argentina. In a letter written to Baillet-Latour two weeks 
after the Oslo session, Bustos Morón, who did not attend the session, said that he and Aldao had voted 
in favor of Tokyo for the 1940 Olympics.41 A year later, Bustos Morón reminded the IOC President that 
he favored Tokyo. In these interactions, Buenos Aires was not even mentioned. Given his silence regard-
ing the city, his position in Argentine sport, and the fact that he occupied several governmental posts, it 
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seems highly unlikely that Bustos Morón was unaware of any Buenos Aires bid.42 The 1940 Games were 
eventually awarded to Tokyo.
In July of 1938, the Japanese, involved in a quest for military conquest, relinquished their bid for 
Tokyo as the site of the 1940 Olympics. The Games were fi rst transferred to Helsinki, which had also bid 
for the Games, and ultimately cancelled because of World War II. Fearing the cancellation, the Comité 
Olímpico Argentino saw an opportunity to take the lead in Olympic matters. Shortly after Adolf Hitler’s 
Germany invaded Poland, new Comité President, Juan Carlos Palacios, wrote to F. W. Rubien, secretary 
of the American Olympic Association, proposing:
In view of the probable suspension of the XII Olympic Games in Finland, due to European 
situation, this Argentinian Olympic Committee believes that the efforts of the nations of 
America . . . could be applied in the meantime through a tournament to be effected based 
on the sports included in the mentioned Games.43
Originally, Palacios referred to the tournament as the “Pan-American Olympic Tournament” and then 
simply as the “Pan-American Games.”44 The event would take place only if plans for the 1940 Olympics 
were abandoned. The Argentines proposed to host a congress in Buenos Aires to organize hemispheric 
sport matters in February 1940 and subsequently the competitions in November. To accommodate the 
greatest number of national delegates, the congress was fi rst postponed to April and then to August.45 
The First Pan-American Congress established the Pan-American Sports Committee and decided to host 
Pan-American Games every four years, starting in Buenos Aires in 1942.46 
The Argentines immediately started to work in favor of the Games. They established the Games’ 
organizing committee and set the festival from November 21 to December 6. Argentine President, Ro-
berto Ortiz, and Buenos Aires mayor, Carlos Pueyrredon, were named respectively honorary President 
and vice-President of the organizing committee.47 The impressive plans included an “Olympic city” and 
“a stadium with a capacity for 75,000 spectators.”48 The organizing committee expected to welcome 
“not less than 2,000 athletes.”49 Everything seemed to fall in place until the Japanese attack on Pearl 
Harbor on December 7, 1941, which prompted the United States to enter the war. With the expansion 
of the confl ict into the Western Hemisphere, many nations declined to participate in the 1942 Pan-
American Games. The Argentines postponed the Games several times in the hope of saving the project 
but to no avail; the war, and the harsh political, economic, and social conditions it imposed proved an 
insurmountable challenge for Olympic enthusiasts.50 In spite of the setback, the Argentine post-war po-
litical environment would soon help renovate hopes of staging the fi rst Pan-American Games in Buenos 
Aires. Argentines even dreamed of bringing the 1956 Olympics to their city.
The Bid for the 1956 Games
The rise of Juan D. Perón to the presidency of Argentina in 1946 marked a dramatic shift in national poli-
tics. Attempting to break with the past, Perón promised the masses “a ‘New Argentina’ based on “social 
justice, political sovereignty, and economic independence.”51 His concept of social justice included an 
innovative array of benefi ts and services for the working class. Broad access to sport and physical edu-
cation was a centerpiece among those innovations. Likewise, Perón did not spare resources to advance 
elite sport. Neither the emphasis placed on popular and elite sport by Perón nor the political return 
he expected from it had precedent in Argentina. In this regard, political scientist Raanan Rein has ob-
served, “no Argentine government prior to Perón . . . invested as much effort and as many resources in 
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both the development and encouragement of sport and in the effort to earn political dividends from this 
policy.”52 In the context of Perón’s “New Argentina,” the hope to host the Olympic Games in Buenos Ai-
res was not only rekindled but received a degree of state commitment never seen before in Argentina.
On January 20, 1948, a year and a half into Perón’s fi rst term in offi ce, the Comité Olímpico Argen-
tino sent a cable and a letter to the IOC announcing that Buenos Aires wanted to organize the 1956 
Olympics.53 A week later, IOC member Bustos Morón cabled the IOC backing up the city’s candidacy. 
Aldao was also on board.54 Before the end of the month, Ricardo Sanchez de Bustamante, then pre-
siding over the Comité, wrote to Sigfrid Edstrøm, who had replaced Baillet-Latour as IOC President, a 
ten-page letter detailing the rationale for Buenos Aires’ bid. For the Argentine Olympic offi cial, Buenos 
Aires was suited to host the 1956 Olympics because of the Comité’s dedication to the Olympic Move-
ment since its creation in 1923, the national sport organization and the extended practice of sport in 
Argentina, and the governmental support to sport. On the other hand, the government had pledged 
all necessary moral and material support for the success of the event, including a national stadium, an 
Olympic village, and other required facilities. Finally, there was a question of principle: since no South 
American city had hosted the Games, Argentina deserved that privilege. For the Comité, if the IOC 
voted for Buenos Aires, it would “satisfy the legitimate aspirations of the government of His Excellency 
the President General Juan D. Perón and that of the sportsmen of the continent.”55 At least in Argentine 
rhetoric, bringing the Games to Buenos Aires fulfi lled both a national and a South American desire.
According to Argentine Olympic offi cials, General Santos V. Rossi, President of the Consejo Nacio-
nal de Educación Física (National Council of Physical Education), created under the auspices of Perón, 
instructed the Comité Olímpico Argentino to communicate to the IOC that Buenos Aires wanted to 
host the 1956 Olympics.56 Undoubtedly, the matter was of utmost importance to the government’s 
highest echelon. Indeed, the Comité later admitted that the bid simply materialized the explicit desire of 
Perón.57 In June of 1948, Aldao and Bustos Morón remitted to their peers in the IOC a letter they had 
sent to Edstrøm detailing Buenos Aires’ bid. The Argentines affi rmed, “we have every reason to expect 
that the Argentine Government would grant the necessary support to permit the Organizing Committee 
of the XVI OLYMPIAD to successfully carry out its work.”58 They concluded by asking for IOC consent, 
stating, “we sincerely hope our Colleagues and Friends will support this initiative and vote in its favour 
when the time arrives to do so.”59 Informing the full IOC membership about Perón’s patronage of the 
project was a wise diplomatic move – the timing was not coincidental. When Buenos Aires appeared 
as a registered candidate for the 1956 Olympics at the next IOC session held during 1948 London 
Olympics, no one should have been surprised. That Buenos Aires received the right to host the fi rst 
Pan-American Games during the Second Pan-American Congress also held while athletes competed in 
London was not surprising either.60 The bidding campaign was in full swing.
While Buenos Aires established itself as a candidate for the 1956 Olympics in the international 
arena, Perón continued to build support for his sport policy at home, a strategy intimately connected 
to his political project. When the Argentine delegation to the 1948 Olympics returned home, a rally 
was held at the Club Atlético, River Plate’s stadium. In his address, Perón linked the athletic work and 
triumphs of the nation’s athletes to the recreation of Argentina by proclaiming:
Let this be our tribute to the glories of sports, to the champions, to all the athletes who are 
constructing the New Argentina we yearned for, an Argentina of healthy men, sturdy men, 
and strong men; because only healthy, tough peoples make great nations.61
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Against a background of unparalleled governmental sustenance of sport, the success of their athletes in 
the 1948 Olympics, and the plans for the fi rst Pan-American Games scheduled for 1951 underway, the 
Argentines move ahead quickly with Buenos Aires’ bid to host the 1956 Olympics. Despite the national 
sport effervescence, Aldao, vigilant of Olympic principles, cautioned Edstrøm in late 1948 that some of 
his government’s deeds in sport were on the verge of transgressing those principles. Certainly, Perón and 
his allies established “a centralized supervisory system overseeing all sports,” including the appointment 
of political cronies in sport federations and organizations. 62 However, Aldao’s cautionary communica-
tion did not mention any irregularities with Buenos Aires’ bid.63 In March of 1949, Rodolfo G. Valen-
zuela, a close associate of Perón who was the new President of the Comité Olímpico Argentino, and 
Rossi wrote to the IOC repeating their wish to organize the 1956 Olympics. The long letter replicated 
the merits of the candidacy, insisting that Buenos Aires “has all the characteristics of the great capitals 
of the world” and that it “is considered one of the better built capitals of America.”64 The Argentines 
also produced for the IOC a lavish book about Argentina that worked as a sort of “formal invitation to 
celebrate the Olympic Games of 1956 in this city [Buenos Aires].”65 In the book, Perón and the city’s 
mayor expressed their support for the bid. Buenos Aires offi cially sent the IOC a good deal of additional 
information about Argentine sports.66 The IOC acknowledged receipt of all material and confi rmed the 
dates of the decisive next IOC session that would take place in Rome.67
On April 28, 1949, offi cials representing the cities bidding for the 1956 Olympics appeared before 
the IOC. They made fi nal attempts to convince IOC members that their city was the best suited to 
host the Games. Argentina was represented by Rafael Ocampo Giménez, Argentine ambassador to 
Italy, Mario L. Negri, future IOC member, Aldao, and Bustos Morón. The latter lobbied his colleagues 
to gain their support. Buenos Aires’ campaign achieved some success in Latin America. For instance, 
days before the election, the Uruguayan Olympic Committee cabled the IOC that it supported Buenos 
Aires.68 But the support was not unanimous; the Brazilian IOC members cabled their votes for Detroit.69 
In spite of the delegation’s effort, Buenos Aires’ bid fell one vote short. Melbourne beat Buenos Aires 
in the fourth round by a vote of 21-20, garnering the right to organize the 1956 Olympics. The Comité 
Olímpico Argentino turned the close defeat into a victory.70 The one vote difference “comforts the spirit 
and satisfi es the highest Argentine desires, for all what it means for our Nation and Argentine sports.”71 
Besides the alleged comfort, the defeat did not discourage a new bid. After all, if Perón demanded so 
much perseverance from his athletes to build the “New Argentina,” he could not desist bidding for the 
Games at the fi rst hindrance he faced. Immediately after Melbourne was awarded the 1956 Olympics, 
the Comité and the Consejo Nacional de Educación Física agreed to bid for the 1960 Olympics.72 Bustos 
Morón promptly expressed his hope that Buenos Aires would host the Games in the near future.73
To show the renewed Argentine commitment to the Olympic Movement, Rossi offered to organize 
the 1950 IOC session in Buenos Aires. Since that session was already scheduled for Copenhagen, Bue-
nos Aires was considered for the following meeting. In Copenhagen, Buenos Aires appeared on lists as 
both a candidate for the 1960 Olympics and for the May 1951 IOC session.74 Buenos Aires was turned 
down for the latter; the IOC chose Vienna. A May 1951 IOC session in Buenos Aires would have been 
great timing and publicity to boost the 1960 Olympic project. The fi rst Pan-American Games held in 
Buenos Aires from February 25 to March 8 was not only well-organized but also designated as a tre-
mendous success of the Peronist regime. Argentine athletes dominated the medal count. An exultant 
Perón declared that the accomplishment was “a new victory that the peronist movement deposits in the 
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altar of the Nation.”75 Shortly after the Games, a confi dent Bustos Morón told Edstrøm that if the 1956 
Olympics could not be held in Melbourne, Buenos Aires would be willing to take over.76 The regime’s 
sport successes and Perón’s dream of Olympic glory in Buenos Aires, as well as his political edifi ce, did 
not last long. In September 1955, the Revolución Libertadora (Liberating Revolution) ousted Perón from 
the presidency. His enemies “sought to eradicate every vestige of Peronism from national life, and one 
of its fi rst move was to ‘de-Peronize’ sports.”77 Little wonder that bringing the Olympics to Buenos Aires 
was not one of the revolution’s priorities.
The Bid for the 1968 Games
The Revolución Libertadora’s crusade against all things Peronist had an immediate impact on the Argen-
tine Olympic Movement. Not only was an Olympic Buenos Aires not prominent on the new authori-
ties’ agenda, but also their actions severely jeopardized the prospect of sending a national delegation 
to the 1956 Olympics. The provisional government named General Fernando I. Huergo as supervisor 
of the Comité Olímpico Argentino in order to oversee and reorganize it. This situation disturbed Avery 
Brundage, a rabid apostle of amateurism and the Olympic doctrine of strict separation between sport 
and politics – something Perón certainly did not practice – who had become IOC President in 1952. In 
April 1956, Brundage warned Argentine offi cials, “As the matter stands it seems that no team from the 
Argentine can be entered in the Melbourne Games.”78 What the IOC wanted was “sport to be ruled 
by sportsmen and not politicians,” as specifi ed in the Olympic rules.79 Internationally pressured, the 
government decreed in August the conclusion of Huergo’s supervision of the Comité with elections 
for new offi cials taking place the following month. Predictably, when Huergo was elected President 
of the reorganized Comité, Peronist sport advocates were nowhere in sight. Given the election of the 
Comité’s new administration, the IOC considered the matter resolved, which allowed Argentine athletes 
to compete in Melbourne.80 However, Argentine Olympic participation did not entice the Revolución 
Libertadora to revive the project to host the Olympic Games in Buenos Aires.
The prospect of an Olympic Buenos Aires was heard once more only when the Revolución Lib-
ertadora withdrew from power. In 1958 the revolution allowed elections but the ban on Peronism was 
not lifted. Arturo Frondizi’s ticket, secretly endorsed by Perón from the exile, emerged as the winner. 
Midway into Frondizi’s term, José Oriani, then presiding over the Comité Olímpico Argentino, expressed 
to the IOC its “hopes as regards the site of the Olympic Games of 1968.”81 These hopes endured and 
survived a convoluted period of Argentine politics in a way that no politician of the time could. In 1962 
Frondizi, defying the Army, lifted the ban on Peronism, whose candidates swept the March gubernato-
rial elections. When Frondizi refused to annul the elections, the Army deposed him. José María Guido, 
President of the Senate, replaced Frondizi. Guido’s was a puppet regime controlled by the military, 
which preferred the pretense of legality to openly seize power.82
Soon afterwards, a plan to continue with the Buenos Aires 1968 bid was announced. In June of 
1962, a short two months after Guido took the oath of offi ce, Hernán Giralt, mayor of Buenos Aires, 
sent to the IOC an “offi cial application . . . requesting that our City be awarded the honour of staging the 
Olympic Games to be held in 1968.”83 Days later, Oriani, made explicit that the “application is endorsed 
and supported by the Argentine Olympic Committee … as well as by those of millions of sportsmen of 
our country.” Oriani framed the bid in historical terms. He argued:
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 …that in several opportunities we made every possible effort in order to be entrusted the 
holding of the greatest of all sport events. You remember that in the course of the 43rd. 
Session of the I.O.C., held in Rome in 1949, Buenos Aires lost by one vote they right to 
be chosen, and from that moment on we have not abandon our intention of staging the 
Games, not only because we consider it a legitimate purpose but also because we are sure 
that we shall be able to organize them maintaining and even endeavouring to surpass the 
brightness and splendor they have always had.84
The argument that the Games had never been held in South America was also mentioned. 85 To strength-
en Buenos Aires’ bid, in August 1962 the Comité Olímpico Argentino produced a book. In addition 
to recounting Argentine Olympic history and describing the amenities that Buenos Aires had to offer, 
Argentine Olympic hopefuls clarifi ed that the government decidedly supported their negotiations.86 The 
book highlighted the support to the bid from Olympic notable Carl Diem, described as “the spiritual 
successor of Baron de Coubertin,” who after a visit to the city declared, “It seems to us that the moment 
has come for the Argentine to offer the world an Olympic festival.”87
In spite of local and international encouragement, misgivings regarding the Buenos Aires’ bid ran 
high both in Argentina – even within the Comité Olímpico Argentino – and abroad. Jorge N. Parsons, a 
Comité’s vice-President, expressed his qualms to the IOC chancellor stating, “we are having so many 
diffi culties here that one hesitates to decide.” Bearing in mind that Parsons thought that Buenos Aires 
was so well equipped that only the Olympic village would have to be constructed, his worries had to be 
political. Adding to domestic second-guessing was the IOC’s position on the bid. IOC chancellor, Otto 
Mayer, had warned Parsons that Brundage opposed the bid of Buenos Aires.88
Whether the dissent was kept among a small group of people or not taken into consideration, local 
Olympic offi cials continued with Buenos Aires’ bid. Perhaps they followed up just to save face. Starting 
with the 1960 Olympics, the IOC required that all candidate cities answer a questionnaire addressing 
their technical and logistical capabilities to host the event.89 In February 1963, the Comité Olímpico 
Argentino returned its questionnaire to the IOC. Alberto Prebisch, who had been appointed mayor of 
Buenos Aires, fully supported the bid.90 While the bid went on its way, internal dissent in the military al-
lowed for another attempt at democracy, and elections were scheduled for July 1963. Arturo U. Illia was 
victorious – and Peronism was still banned. The following month, President-elect, Illia, assured Oriani 
that if the IOC chose Buenos Aires for 1968, “I can promise the most extensive support of the people 
and government, defi nitively united, in their efforts to coat the Olympic Games with a splendour ac-
cording to its precedents.”91 With Illia’s endorsement, Oriani and Prebisch launched a last effort to con-
vince IOC members to give the Games to Buenos Aires. Oriani affi rmed that “Our country … following 
democratic principles pointed by our National Constitution, is ready to carry on its progress till the fi nal 
recovery.”92 He surely forecasted the apprehension that the Argentine recent political history might have 
caused in the IOC.
The IOC session that selected the city for the 1968 Olympics met late in October 1963 in Baden-
Baden; Illia had already been sworn into offi ce. Illia’s and Oriani’s promises of national unity were total-
ly unconvincing. Equally unpersuasive were the three Argentine delegates that delivered a presentation 
on behalf of the nation’s capital. It appeared that for the IOC members Buenos Aires’ bid did not even 
exist. In a landslide, Mexico City was granted the right to host the 1968 Olympics, while Buenos Aires 
received a meager two votes, one presumably from the lone Argentine IOC member. The result was a 
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disaster when compared to the city’s bid for the 1956 Olympics. That Buenos Aires’ bid survived such 
domestic political turmoil could be seen as a sign that Argentine politicians – Peronist or not – under-
stood the uses to which sport and the Olympic Games could be subjected. However, that survival, as 
impressive as it was, did not pass muster with the IOC. Ultimately, the IOC’s disregard for Buenos Aires 
was not unwise. In June of 1966, President Illia’s fate was sealed by another coup. Although the nation 
hosted the football (soccer) FIFA World Cup in 1978, the dream of an Olympic Buenos Aires entered a 
long interregnum.
The Bid for the 2004 Games
The project of an Olympic Buenos Aires was dusted off in the 1990s by a Peronist government. During 
his presidential campaign, Carlos S. Menem promised a litany of traditional Peronist populist policies. 
However, soon after assuming the presidency in 1989, Menem replaced his party’s conventional eco-
nomic platform with a neoliberal, market-oriented program focused on the liberalization, deregulation, 
and privatization of the economy. The dramatic shift in economic policy produced a strong macroeco-
nomic performance between 1991 and 1997. Argentina’s successful story of reform became the darling 
of the economic international establishment. With domestic and international credibility on the rise, 
in 1994 Menem pushed a constitutional reform that would allow him to seek his reelection. The ma-
nipulation of institutions to his advantage was typical of Menem’s style of government, which did not 
help consolidate the fragile democratic system.93 Beyond merits and shortcomings, it was precisely dur-
ing this period of radical reforms that Menem’s government articulated its bid for the 2004 Olympics. 
Although the election of the host city was scheduled for September 1997, Menem’s reelection for the 
1995-1999 period allowed him to witness his Olympic campaign from start to fi nish.
According to politicians in his party, the idea of bidding for the 2004 Olympics originated with 
Menem himself.94 In regards to sport, Menem followed a traditionally-oriented Peronist policy. Even 
his critics acknowledged that Menem’s sport policy was the only area in which he proved to be a le-
gitimate Peronist.95 The government support for sport was made evident in the funds poured into the 
organization of the 1995 Pan-American Games held in the coastal city of Mar del Plata. By the time of 
this event, it was quite clear in the Olympic Movement that Buenos Aires intended to bid for the 2004 
Olympics. In mid-1994, Menem signed an executive decree creating the bid committee, led by Fran-
cisco A. Mayorga, state secretary of tourism and sports. The committee had a U.S.$6 million budget.96 
Due to concerns about the expenditures of cities bidding for the Olympic Games, the work involved 
in the process, and the large number of cities interested in the 2004 Olympics, the IOC decided to 
implement a two-tiered selection process. In the fi rst phase, an IOC evaluation commission would 
scrutinize the eleven cities’ bids and prepare a report. Based on the evaluation commission’s report, a 
selection college would choose fi ve fi nalists on March 7, 1997. The second phase, which allowed IOC 
members to visit the fi ve fi nalists, would involve the election of the host city during the IOC session 
held in Lausanne on September 5, 1997. Knowing the election process, Mayorga’s committee set out a 
comprehensive bidding plan.97
The Buenos Aires 2004 bid committee produced an impressive dossier. The three–volume tome 
started by describing a long and distinguished Argentine Olympic history, the close defeat of the bid for 
the 1956 Olympics, the grandeur of Buenos Aires, and the city’s love of sport, all of which gave the com-
mittee the “hope, strength and determination to struggle for the honor of hosting the Olympic Games in 
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South America for the fi rst time in history.”98 The historical arguments used by previous city’s bids had 
not been forgotten. However, knowing that history and claims of justice are relevant but hardly enough 
to gain the endorsement of the IOC, the Buenos Aires 2004 bid committee composed a comprehensive 
technical blueprint for the Games. The centerpiece was an “Olympic corridor,” a combination of three 
major avenues along which there were existing and projected sport facilities. These facilities would have 
permitted the staging of 24 of the 28 sport planned in a tight geographical area. The “Olympic corri-
dor,” which included the Olympic stadium, village, and media center, promised convenient access and 
transportation to and between competition venues. According to the dossier, 75 percent of the venues 
were already in place, and the impact of the whole project on the city’s environment would be minimal. 
The improvement of urban infrastructure and the legacy of the Games were as much emphasized as the 
cultural programs projected.99
While the bid was amply supported in Argentina, Mayorga and his team traveled the world to make its 
details known to the Olympic family. Late in 1996, the IOC evaluation commission visited Buenos Aires 
and in February 1997 sent all eleven bidding cities individualized technical reports. In the case of Buenos 
Aires, the evaluation commission lauded the “Olympic corridor,” among other features of the blueprint. 
Although there were some criticisms the report was altogether positive. Mayorga informed Menem at 
once. The leader of the bid committee was confi dent that Buenos Aires would pass the selection college 
cut on March 7, 1997 to become one of the fi ve fi nalists.100 He was right. A month later IOC member 
Marc Hodler announced in Lausanne that Buenos Aires had made the cut, becoming the only South 
American city left in the race for the 2004 Olympics. Menem was ecstatic. From then on, the key to the 
success of the bid was to convince IOC members that Buenos Aires was the best city for the Games. More 
than seventy IOC members accepted the invitation to visit Buenos Aires, most of whom were allegedly 
impressed with the city’s project.101 However, according to the media, some IOC members were wary of 
the local organizational aptitude as well as of the honesty of some Argentine offi cials.102
The days before the early September 1997 election, Buenos Aires’ bid was a major topic of dis-
cussion in Argentine society. In the meantime, bid offi cials as well as politicians – including Menem – , 
sport administrators, civic leaders, and businesspeople traveled to Lausanne for the election. The bid 
committee made a carefully prepared fi nal presentation. Everybody knew that it was a long shot for 
Buenos Aires but given the praise received by the bid, there were reasonably high expectations that 
the city would at least make a very good showing. Some might have believed that a huge surprise was 
possible. Hugo Porta, then state secretary of sports, declared: “I had the hope to win in Lausanne, al-
though I knew that we were not the candidates.”103 The hopes proved to be totally groundless. Buenos 
Aires tied with Cape Town in the fi rst round with the fewest votes – 16. In the run-off that determined 
which of the two cities would be eliminated, Cape Town won 62-44. It was a bitter pill for Argentine 
offi cials to accept that Buenos Aires did not pass the fi rst round. After the election many in Argentina 
suggested possible reasons for the defeat, absence of Argentine sport administrators at the international 
level, weak sport and urban infrastructure, infrequent organization of premier international sport events, 
poor athletic performances in previous Olympic Games, inadequate state support for athletes, among 
others. As reasonable as they were, these observations did not address the viability of the Games in the 
face of the larger Argentine political and economic context. Perhaps the IOC did pay close attention 
to Argentina’s conditions in the 1990s and, more broadly, to its persistent and widespread political and 
economic instability.
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Although the 1983 democratic transition put an end to more than fi fty years of military interven-
tion on Argentine politics, the nation was still vulnerable and the subject of institutional crises. Indeed, 
Menem’s inauguration took place six months earlier than scheduled because Raúl Alfonsín, his prede-
cessor, resigned amidst a chaotic economic situation. Menem fi nished his second mandate in 1999 and 
transferred power to Fernando De la Rúa, but his economic policies generated an extraordinary degree 
of social exclusion and inequality. In 1998, the Argentine economy entered into a long recession. Added 
to De la Rúa’s own inabilities, this unpleasant legacy eventually led to a remakable economic turn down 
and political crisis. De la Rúa resigned on December 20, 2001. His vice-President, displeased with the 
administration’s reaction to a corruption scandal, had resigned earlier. The interim President chosen 
by Congress resigned on December 31, 2001. The following day, Congress appointed another interim 
President, who called for elections in 2003.104 On January 25, 2002, Jacques Rogge, President of the 
IOC, referring to the Argentine crisis, declared, “Look what happens today in that country and imagine 
what would have occurred had we fi nally granted them the Olympic Games.” Rogge added that the 
IOC would award the Olympic Games to an emergent country only if it enjoys political, economic, and 
social stability, otherwise it “is a risk, as the current crisis in Argentina demonstrates.”105
Given that so much rides for the Olympic Movement on celebrating successful Games, IOC mem-
ber Richard W. Pound has contended, “it is easy to see that what is more important for the IOC is not 
necessarily to make the right choice for a particular city but to avoid making the wrong decision.”106 For 
Pound, a wrong decision is to “choose a city that proves to be incapable of organizing good Games.”107 
In this case, the IOC did not make such a mistake. After the failed Buenos Aires bid for the 2004 Olym-
pics, some Argentines expressed interest in renewing the Olympic dream. Those heard before the 2001 
political and economic crisis rapidly dissipated; those heard afterwards are quietly starting to repeat the 
old aspirations. Their target seems to be 2016.108
Interpreting Buenos Aires’ Efforts to Host the Olympic Games
Argentine politicians, sport administrators, and Olympic offi cials have shown interest in hosting the 
Olympic Games in Buenos Aires at various times in the twentieth century. Expressions of interest in-
tensifi ed after the creation in 1923 of the Comité Olímpico Argentino. Although Argentine Olympic 
offi cials have evidently perceived the attempts to bring the Olympic Games to Buenos Aires as an 
important aspect in their role as promoters of the Olympic Movement in their nation, some of their 
claims about the status of several of these attempts are, as indicated in the introduction of this paper, 
less evident. Some of the confusion regarding Buenos Aires’ efforts might stem from the fact that during 
the fi rst half century of the IOC, it was not always clear what amounted to an “offi cial” bid. Before the 
1950s, applying for the Olympic Games was “a much less standardized and detail oriented bidding and 
selection process” than what it would became.109
Even if the bidding and selection process was not developed and structured until the 1950s, it seems 
clear that early claims to host the Olympic Games in Buenos Aires were unsubstantiated. Both Senator 
Gonzalez’s comments in 1909 and Aldao’s in 1924 did not amount to more than amorphous manifesta-
tions of desire that one day Buenos Aires would host the Olympic Games. Although their comments 
indicate enthusiasm for the Olympic Movement, they did not include any comprehensive plan. Aldao’s 
promise of a Champ des sports, including a massive national stadium, to be built in his Club de Gimnasia 
y Esgrima de Buenos Aires (Buenos Aires Gymnastic and Fencing Club), can hardly be considered a plan. 
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Having presided over the Argentine Olympic delegation to the 1924 Paris Olympics, he must have real-
ized that a Champ des sports was important but by no means the only requirement to host the Olympic 
Games. Perhaps his comments were meant to convey the Argentine commitment to the Olympic Move-
ment following the creation of the Comité Olímpico Argentino. In spite of hypothetical governmental 
support, the Champ des sports never materialized.
The attempt to bring the Olympic Games to Buenos Aires in 1936 is more diffi cult to analyze and 
classify. Initial communications between local Olympic offi cials and the IOC indicate a somewhat 
stronger pledge to organize the event than Aldao’s 1924 promises. After the IOC manifested skepticism 
about Buenos Aires’ project, Aldao announced that whatever was needed for the Games would be 
fi nished before 1936, including the colossal stadium. Aldao even made vague promises related to as-
sistance with travel and accommodation for visiting delegations. According to him, the government sup-
ported the effort of the Comité Olímpico Argentino. Aldao’s reassurance made the IOC change its mind 
and Buenos Aires was listed as a candidate in 1930. However, the city was not considered in the 1931 
election. Running afoul of IOC politics, Aldao and Alvear resigned from the organization in 1930. If the 
wrangle between them and the IOC leadership was not enough to destroy the chances of Buenos Aires, 
the September 1930 overthrow of President Yrigoyen’s government killed the city’s hopes. Resignations 
from the IOC combined with political turmoil was too much instability for the IOC. After Aldao’s and 
Alvear’s resignations, the bid was more likely seen as imprudent even within Argentina.
Whether local or international offi cials withdrew Buenos Aires from the contest, the city did not 
reach the election. After the Argentine IOC members resigned from the IOC, there were no more strong 
indications that Buenos Aires was still interested in the Games. It is also likely that for the coup authori-
ties bringing the Games to Buenos Aires was not important. For whatever reasons, the prospect of a 
1936 Olympic Buenos Aires was abandoned both at home and abroad, which suggests that despite its 
initial strength, the project never reached any signifi cant degree of maturity. Failure to reach the elec-
tion stage for the 1936 Olympics did not discourage Argentine Olympic offi cials from wanting the 1940 
Olympics, although comments were not accompanied with any plans and they quickly evaporated. 
Similarly, the idea to host the Games in Buenos Aires in 1960 was never developed. Those brief efforts, 
while showing commitment to an old hope and to the Olympic Movement, were merely informal ex-
pressions of interest.
The fi rst attempt to host the Olympic Games in Buenos Aires that can be considered a full bid was 
the effort put forward for the 1956 Olympics. Fully embraced by Perón’s government, the bid was tied 
to the enormous importance that sport played in his political program and ambitions. In addition to 
arguing that Buenos Aires was a splendid city, that sport was wildly popular in Argentina, and that the 
Games had never been awarded to South America, Perón promised all kind of resources to host the 
event. Considering the ostentation displayed during the fi rst Pan-American Games held in 1951 during 
his fi rst presidency, it is likely that Perón would have fulfi lled his promise. The bid rallied tremendous 
support in the IOC, eventually losing to Melbourne by one vote – the closest election ever for a bid. 
However, as pointed out, not all of South America was behind Buenos Aires’ bid. Rio de Janeiro had 
also long aspired to be the fi rst regional city to host the Games. It is not improbable that the contest for 
this “fi rst” worked against the election of Buenos Aires. Opposition to Perón’s autocratic regime also 
negatively infl uenced the outcome of the bid. Regardless of the reasons for the loss, the IOC must have 
been reassured with its decision when it learned that Perón had been ousted by a coup a year before 
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the 1956 Olympics. The mere thought of the countless uncertainties that would have arisen had the 
Games been awarded to Buenos Aires, must have been unsettling.
The second full bid was the attempt to host the 1968 Olympics in Buenos Aires. The Comité Olímpi-
co Argentino repeated the arguments advanced in the race for the 1956 Olympics. The loss by one vote 
to Melbourne was constructed as a sign of unrequited Olympic commitment and used along with the 
claim saying that the Games had never been celebrated in South America as a sort of moral appeal. But 
the bid, which in the course of over two years endured and survived one coup and two democratically 
elected Presidents, generated anxieties in Argentina and abroad. There were doubts within the Comité, 
and IOC President Brundage was opposed to Buenos Aires for 1968. The problems were not technical 
but political. Facing domestic political instability and opposed by the IOC President himself, the bid did 
not have any future. At the time of the election, it received two solitary votes. In all probability, South 
American IOC members rallied behind the bid of Mexico City, which became the fi rst Latin American 
city to host the Games in a landslide vote. The meager IOC support for Buenos Aires 1968 did not worry 
its members as much when President Illia was overthrown in 1966.
The last attempt to date to host the Olympic Games in Buenos Aires was the bid for the 2004 Olym-
pics. It was the best Buenos Aires bid ever presented. The usual historic arguments claimed the Games 
on moral ground. In addition, the bid dossier included a comprehensive technical blueprint to host the 
Games, whose highlight was the praised “Olympic corridor.” The bid gathered strong domestic support 
and international attention. Consistent with President Menem’s market-oriented reforms, the bid was 
seen as a catalyst to showcase the progress of Argentina in the 1990s. However, local offi cials failed 
to assess or incorporate in their bid analyses and predictions the larger political and economic forces 
at play in Argentina. Encouraged by the economic boom, they could not, or did not want to, perceive 
those forces. This blindness reveals a poor understanding of IOC dynamics. The IOC, an institution 
with conservative lineaments, did not fail to locate the bid in the larger domestic and international 
context. Although it praised the technical aspects of the bid, the IOC doubted the viability of what was 
promised. A fragile political system, whose central feature is instability and an irregularly performing 
economy, was not the ideal framework for the IOC. The elimination of Buenos Aires in the fi rst round 
was not by any means what Argentine offi cials imagined. But the IOC was right. The crash of the 
economy and the political disaster of late 2001 confi rmed the acumen of the IOC’s customary position 
to elect host cities: prioritize stability, even if it means postponing the materialization of the universal 
values of the Games.
The protracted interest in hosting the Olympic Games in Buenos Aires sheds lights on the role and 
importance that Argentina has imagined for itself in the Olympic Movement. The expressions of interest 
and bids studied have usually been portrayed as a measure of continuity in the Argentine commitment 
to the Olympic Movement since its creation in 1894, as well as a sign of regional leadership in the 
diffusion of its ideals. Indeed, it has been a recurrent theme in the bids to maintain that Buenos Aires 
was carrying not only the aspirations of the Argentine people but also that of all South Americans. The 
hosting of the Games in Buenos Aires has also been predicted as an event that would take national and 
regional sport to new and unprecedented heights. Along with the rationale of strong historical leader-
ship, Argentine Olympic hopefuls have insisted that the universalism inherent in the Olympic ideals 
merits bringing the Games to South America and that Buenos Aires is ideally suited for the challenge. 
This argument found even more vitality after Buenos Aires lost the 1956 Olympics to Melbourne by one 
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vote. Locally, this close election and the fact that Buenos Aires was a fi nalist for the 2004 Olympics have 
been thought as an indication of the distinctive position Argentina enjoys in the Olympic Movement.
In addition to the self-appointed leadership role in regional Olympic matters, Buenos Aires’ at-
tempts to host the Olympic Games reveal an intention to situate the city among the great capitals of 
the world. This, of course, was intimately connected with the portrayal of Argentina as a vibrant nation 
at the “New World” center of Western civilization. The bids’ narratives told a story of Buenos Aires as 
a dynamic metropolis possessing the charm and the qualities essential to host the greatest of all sport 
events. This is consistent with the purposeful portrayal, domestically and internationally, by Argentine 
elites throughout the twentieth century of Buenos Aires as the Paris of South America.110 In the minds of 
many porteños as well as foreigners, Buenos Aires has such a Parisian character, which arguably makes 
it so different from all other South American cities. Seen as a European enclave, an Olympic Buenos 
Aires felt much closer to the Eurocentric project started by Coubertin in the early 1890s. The quest to 
garner the Olympic Games in Buenos Aires has cemented the Argentine own self-determined place in 
Latin America.
The continuities in the legitimating narratives constructed by Buenos Aires’ Olympic campaigns to 
project certain representations of the role, and the importance of Argentina in the Olympic Movement, 
as well as of Buenos Aires and Argentina in the Western worl,d have been accompanied by some frac-
tures that show the changing relationship among politics, sport, and Olympic matters in Argentina. The 
earlier designs to host the Games in Buenos Aires were articulated at a time in which “sporting activity 
in Argentina was largely a private effort by various sport associations, while the state was conspicuous 
by its absence or apathy.”111 That is why Aldao’s Club de Gimnasia y Esgrima de Buenos Aires, along 
with the Comité Olímpico Argentino, was at the center of those efforts. The state was, of course, pres-
ent, but its role was merely supportive. The actors carrying the work forward, albeit connected with 
the government, were in the private realm. This was quite visible in the preparations for the failed 1942 
Pan-American Games. The structure changed with Perón. The state became conspicuously active in 
sport politics. In the bid for the 1956 Olympics, the government through its control of the sport and 
Olympic spheres became the main actor. After Perón, governments were never again apathetic about 
sport, but their involvement was not always so focused and centralized. Starting with the bid for the 
1956 Olympics, the more the state apparatus controlled sport, the more the bids were tied to partisan 
political programs.
Even though failure has been the common denominator of the now nearly century-long aspiration 
to host the Olympic Games in Buenos Aires, there is much to learn from the continuities and fractures, 
that is the history, of these attempts. The legitimating narratives constructed around Buenos Aires’ ef-
forts constitute a fascinating entry to analyze the entangled connections of politics, sport, and the Olym-
pic Movement in Argentina. In the attempt to construct an Olympic Buenos Aires, Argentines have, to 
use Benedict Anderson’s terminology, told themselves stories about who they are and who they want to 
become.112 After the relative stillness that followed the failed bid for the 2004 Olympics, the old Olym-
pic hope is gradually being revived. The success of Argentine athletes in Athens, who won the nation’s 
fi rst gold medal in more than fi fty years, as well as the recent economic recovery, might be the forces 
behind the move. Whether or not Buenos Aires bids in the near future, the debate itself is forcing the 
Argentine people to ponder once again who they are and who they want to become.
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A Brief Excursus into the Future
Few months ago the Pan-American Sport Organization (PASO) held its general assembly in Buenos Ai-
res. The occasion drew Olympic and sport leaders from the Western hemisphere and beyond. Indeed, 
Rogge made the long trip to Buenos Aires. As is customary for this kind of sport events, the gathering 
was also visited by a number of local politicians. The Comité Olímpico Argentino’s set up in the Hotel 
Panamericano was impeccable. Although the PASO general assembly was to discuss hemispheric sport 
affairs, for some the temptation to resuscitate the dream of Olympic Games in Buenos Aires was impos-
sible to abandon. After all, it was a gathering of the hemispheric Olympic family and it was in all places 
in Buenos Aires. Opening the general assembly, Argentine Vice-President, Daniel Scioli, declared, “The 
city of Buenos Aires can be the host of the Olympic Games in 2016. From the current recovery of our 
country we have to work towards this objective that, without a doubt, we can achieve.”113 Scioli went 
on to say that the Games provides ample opportunity to develop industries such as sport and tourism. 
Rogge and Mario Vázquez Raña, President of PASO, were supportive of the idea. While the former 
thought that Buenos Aires had the necessary conditions to bid, the latter believed that it has the capacity 
to organize the Olympic Games.114
However, the renewed prospect of an Olympic Buenos Aires did not entice all local political and 
sport leaders. Without contradicting either Scioli or infl uential Olympic actors, Claudio Morresi, state 
secretary of sports, warned, “That is a dream of everyone, but we must be cautious.”115 Some journalists 
were more emphatic against a bid. Mariano Ryan, writing for the Buenos Aires daily Clarín, affi rmed 
that in spite of the recent economic recovery, a country with the levels of unemployment, poverty, and 
insecurity of Argentina couldn’t aspire to host the Games in the near future. He also mentioned that the 
South American Games, a rather humble operation compared to the Olympic Games, scheduled to 
take place in Buenos Aires in November of this year, is giving headaches to the city’s organizers.116 It is 
worth mentioning that late in 2001 Córdoba, a city in the center of Argentina, bailed out from organiz-
ing the 2002 South American Games – an embarrassing defeat for a nation with Olympic aspirations.117 
The organization of the 2006 South American Games in Buenos Aires is locally portrayed as another 
measure of the country’s recovery.
Critics of a future bid to host the Olympic Games in Buenos Aires rightly point out the social exclu-
sion and inequality raging in Argentina. This does not deny the stabilization and growth of the economy 
in the last three years but indicates the necessity to debate whether the nation should even consider 
bidding for the Games in such a social environment. What the critics only imply tangentially, since 
the economic and social spheres are always intimately interwoven with it, is the political viability to 
bring the Games to Buenos Aires. Given Argentina’s long history of institutional instability and lack of 
credibility, this seems to be the crucial point. Things might be changing on this front too. Political sci-
entists Steven Levitsky and María Victoria Murillo believe, “If institutional instability remains a central 
feature of contemporary Argentine politics, however, the scope of that instability may be narrowing.” 
The democratic institutions established in the 1980s and the market-oriented institutions created in the 
1990s have survived several political and economic crises. The prospect of renewed military interven-
tion seems to have faded. For Levitsky and Murillo
This core institutional stability constitutes a signifi cant break with earlier patterns, and it permits a 
measure of optimism about Argentina’s political future, even as the country struggles to recover from 
the devastating crises of the not-too-distant past.118
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Political and economic institutions take a long time and a great deal of effort to solidify. Until that 
mild optimism materializes in stable, credible, and predictable institutions, the dream of an Olympic 
Buenos Aires remains fragile. In the meantime, Argentina should attend to its pressing social needs and 
demands so that everyone in the nation can have Olympic dreams. However, if Buenos Aires articulates 
a bid in the near future, one has to pay close attention; for, as Pound has observed, the IOC’s results in 
terms of selecting host cities “are often astonishing, and have been known to defy subsequent analy-
sis.”119 With the IOC one never knows for sure.
Endnotes
1 Natives of Buenos Aires are known as porteños in Spanish.
2 Buenos Aires 2004 (Buenos Aires: n.p., 1997), 1, p. 10.
3 See, for example, La Nación (Buenos Aires) (hereafter La Nación), 9 June 1997, Suplemento especially, p. 3.
4 “Argentina and Olympism,” Olympic Review 87-88, (January-February 1975), p. 28.
5 Simón Silvestrini has argued this point in an unpublished manuscript entitled “Juegos Olímpicos de 1896 
al 2008. Estadísticas. Candidaturas y sedes. Ciudades, países, continentes.” In his account, Silvestrini in-
cluded the attempt to host the 1956 equestrian competitions that could not be organized in Melbourne.
6 Some of their claims regarding Zubiaur’s relation to the Olympic Movement were historically dubious. See 
Cesar R. Torres, “Mass Sport Through Education or Elite Olympic Sport? José Benjamín Zubiaur’s Dilemma 
and Argentina’s Olympic Sports Legacy,” Olympika: The International Journal of Olympic Studies 7 (1998), 
pp. 61-88.
7 See ibid and Cesar R. Torres “Tribulations and Achievements: The Early History of Olympism in Argen-
tina,” The International Journal of the History of Sport 18/3 (2001), pp. 59-92.
8 See Torres, “Ideas encontradas: la educación física y el deporte en el debate parlamentario sobre la par-
ticipación argentina en los Juegos Olímpicos de 1908,” Olympika: The International Journal of Olympic 
Studies 11 (2002), pp. 117-142.
9 Joaquín V. Gonzalez, Obras Completas (Buenos Aires: Universidad Nacional de La Plata, 1935), pp. 9, 344.
10 Ibid.
11 See Memoria de la comisión del centenario al poder ejecutivo nacional (Buenos Aires: Coni, 1910); Guía-
programa de los festejos del centenario, 1810-1910 (Buenos Aires: Talleres Heliográfi cos de Ortega y Ra-
daelli, 1910); and Comisión auxiliar de Juegos Olímpicos del centenario. Programa del concurso atlético 
internacional. Mayo 1910. Buenos Aires (Buenos Aires: Establecimiento Tipográfi co J. Carbone, 1910).
12 Yves-Pierre Boulongne, “The Presidency of Pierre de Coubertin (1896-1925),” in 1894-1994. The Interna-
tional Olympic Committee – One Hundred Years. The Idea, The Presidents, The Achievement, 3 vols., su-
pervised by Raymond Gafner (Lausanne: International Olympic Committee, 1995), 1:105. See also Otto 
Mayer, A Travers les Anneaux Olympiques (Geneva: Pierre Cailler, 1960), p. 61.
13 For an account of this period’s struggles, see Torres, “Tribulations and Achievements;” idem, “‘If We Had 
Had Our Argentine Team Here!’ Football and the 1924 Argentine Olympic Team,” Journal of Sport Histo-
ry 30/1 (2003), pp. 1-24; and idem, “A Time of Confl ict: Argentine Sports and the 1924 Olympic Team,” 
in Kevin B. Wamsley, Robert K. Barney and Scott G. Martyn (eds.), The Global Nexus Engaged: Past, 
413
An Account of Buenos Aires’ Efforts to Host the Olympic Games
Present, Future Interdisciplinary Olympic Studies (London, ON: International Center for Olympic Studies, 
2002), pp. 161-170.
14 Ricardo C. Aldao, Rapport sur les sports en Argentine (Paris: Imprimerie Dubois & Bauer, 1924), p. 6.
15 Ibid., pp. 6-8.
16 Ibid., p. 8.
17 La Nación, 15 July 1924, p. 1.
18 See Rafael Cullen to Henri de Baillet-Latour, 11 August 1923; and Ricardo C. Aldao to Henri de Baillet-
Latour, 5 September 1923, “Jeux Régionaux. Correspondance, conférences et documents. 1924-1928” 
(hereafter “Jeux Régionaux. 1924-1928”), Le Comite International Olympique Archives (hereafter IOC Ar-
chives), Lausanne, Switzerland. 
19 La Nación, 4 July 1924, p. 1.
20 See Procès-Verbaux du 26ème. Session du Comité International Olympique, 1925 Prague, IOC Archives; 
and Wolf Lyberg, The IOC Sessions. 1894-1955, (Lausanne: International Olympic Comittee, 1989), p. 126.
21 See Procès-Verbaux du 24ème. Session du Comité International Olympique, 1927 Monaco, IOC Ar-
chives; and Lyberg, The IOC Sessions. 1894-1955, p. 138.
22 Ricardo C. Aldao to Henri de Baillet-Latour, 30 June 1928, “JO Ete 1936. Correspondance Generale. 
1924-1931” (hereafter “JO Ete 1936”), IOC Archives.
23 Ibid.
24 Anon. to Ricardo C. Aldao, 10 August 1928, “JO Ete 1936,” IOC Archives.
25 Ricardo C. Aldao to IOC Secretary, 30 January 1929, “28E Session Lausanne 1929. Correspondance. 
1929-1929,” IOC Archives.
26 Ricardo C. Aldao to Henri de Baillet-Latour, 3 April 1929, “JO Ete 1936,” IOC Archives. In 1927 Alvear 
dissolved the Comité Olímpico Argentino and conferred to the Confederación Argentina de Deportes 
(Argentine Confederation of Sports) the attributes of the former. Because this organization functioned as 
the National Olympic Committee, it was referred to as Confederación Argentina de Deportes-Comité 
Olímpico Argentino (CADCOA) until 1956, at which point the Comité Olímpico Argentino and the Con-
federación Argentina de Deportes once again became separate entities. Despite the period in which the 
CADCOA functioned as the Olympic authority in Argentina, for simplicity’s sake and to avoid confusion, 
I will use Comité Olímpico Argentino throughout the text.
27 Yrigoyen had also preceded Alvear in the presidency. For an account of Yrigogen’s and Alvear’s terms see 
David Rock, Argentina, 1516-1987. From Spanish Colonization to Alfonsín (Berkeley: University of Califor-
nia Press, 1987), pp. 199-213; and Luis Alberto Romero, A History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century, 
trans. James P. Brennan (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002), pp. 27-58. 
28 See Procès-Verbaux du 29ème. Session du Comité International Olympique,1930 Berlin, IOC Archives; 
and Lyberg, The IOC Sessions. 1894-1955, p. 159.
29 Ricardo C. Aldao to Henri de Baillet-Latour, 31 May 1930, “Baillet-Latour, Henri de. Correspondance. 
1925-1930” (hereafter “Baillet-Latour. 1925-1930”), IOC Archives. See also La Prensa (Buenos Aires) 
(hereafter La Prensa), 29 May 1930, p. 18.
30 Marcelo T. de Alvear to Henri de Baillet-Latour, 6 June 1930; Henri de Baillet-Latour to Ricardo C. Aldao, 
12 June 1930; Henri de Baillet-Latour to Marcelo T. de Alvear, 14 June 1930; Marcelo T. de Alvear to 
Henri de Baillet-Latour, 18 June 1930; and Ricardo C. Aldao to Henri de Baillet-Latour, 1 July 1930, “Bail-
let-Latour. 1925-1930,” IOC Archives. See also La Prensa, 29 May 1930, p. 18.
414
Torres
31 See Procès-Verbaux du 30ème. Session du Comité International Olympique, 1930 Barcelona, IOC Ar-
chives; and Lyberg, The IOC Sessions. 1894-1955, pp. 159, 164.
32 Miguel de Beistegui to A. G. Berdez, 30 April 1931, “JO Ete 1936,” IOC Archives.
33 H. de Baillet-Latour to R.C. Aldao and M.T. de Alvear, ca. April 1931, “JO Ete 1936,” IOC Archives.
34 Ricardo C. Aldao to Henri de Baillet-Latour, 24 July 1931; Henri de Baillet-Latour to Members of the ex-
ecutive Board, 12 October 1931; and Henri de Baillet-Latour to Marcelo T. de Alvear, 12 June 1932, “Bail-
let-Latour, Henri de. Correspondance. 1931-1938” (hereafter “Baillet-Latour. 1931-1938”), IOC Archives. 
See also Confederación Argentina de Deportes-Comité Olímpico Argentino, Memoria y balance. Periodo: 
1 de noviembre de 1930 al 31 de octubre de 1931 (Buenos Aires: n.p., 1931), pp. 14-15.
35 See Confederación Argentina de Deportes-Comité Olímpico Argentino, Memoria y balance. Periodo: 1 
de noviembre de 1930 al 31 de octubre de 1931 (Buenos Aires: n.p., 1931), 14-15; Ricardo C. Aldao to 
Henri de Baillet-Latour, 4 November 1931, “Baillet-Latour. 1931-1938;” and Ricardo C. Aldao to Interna-
tional Olympic Committee, 27 October 1931, “Aldao, Ricardo. Correspondance. 1927-1958” (hereafter 
“Aldao”), IOC Archives.
36 For details of the coup’s impact on Argentine life see Rock, Argentina, 1516-1987. From Spanish Colonization 
to Alfonsín, 214-261; Romero, A history of Argentina in the Twentieth Century, pp. 59-90; and Alberto Ciria, 
Parties and Power in Modern Argentina,1930-1946 (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1974).
37 Jorge Alemandri, Cincuentenario del Club de Gimnasia y Esgrima, 1880-1930 (Buenos Aires: n.p., 1931), p. 186.
38 Bulletin Offi ciel du Comité International Olympique, 18 (July 1931), p.5. See also Confederación Argen-
tina de Deportes-Comité Olímpico Argentino, Memoria y balance. Periodo: 1 de noviembre de 1930 al 
31 de octubre de 1931, pp. 50-51. 
39 See Procès-Verbaux du 31ème. Session du Comité International Olympique, 1932 Los Angeles, IOC Ar-
chives; and Lyberg, The IOC Sessions. 1894-1955, p. 168.
40 See Procès-Verbaux du 34ème. Session du Comité International Olympique, 1935 Oslo, IOC Archives; 
and Lyberg, The IOC Sessions. 1894-1955, p. 185.
41 Horacio Bustos Morón to Henri de Baillet-Latour, 15 March 1935, “36E Session Berlin 1936. Resultats 
Vote. 1936-1936” (hereafter “36E Session Berlin 1936”), IOC Archives.
42 Horacio Bustos Morón to Henri de Baillet-Latour, 27 June 1936, “36E Session Berlin 1936,” IOC Archives.
43 Juan Carlos Palacios to F. W. Rubien, 27 September 1939, “Record Series 26/20/37, Box 202” (hereafter “Box 202”), 
Avery Brundage Collection, 1908-1982 (hereafter Avery Brundage Collection), University of Illinois Archives.
44 See, for example, ibid; and Juan Carlos Palacios and Oscar J. Camilión to Henri de Baillet-Latour, 5 De-
cember 1939, “Argentine. Correspondance. 1907-1965” (hereafter “Argentine”), IOC Archives.
45 Juan Carlos Palacios to Avery Brundage, 12 January 1940; and Juan Carlos Palacios to Avery Brundage, 15 
July 1940, “Box 202,” Avery Brundage Collection. 
46 See First Panamerican Congress, ca. August 1940; and Panamerican Sports Committee, ca. August 1940, 
“Box 202,” Avery Brundage Collection. This committee was the precursor to what is now the Pan-Ameri-
can Sports Organization (PASO). See also Confederación Argentina de Deportes-Comité Olímpico Ar-
gentino, Memoria y balance general-inventario. Periodo: 1 de octubre de 1939 al 30 de septiembre de 
1940 (Buenos Aires: n.p., 1940), pp. 15-29.
47 See also Confederación Argentina de Deportes-Comité Olímpico Argentino, Memoria y balance general-in-
ventario. Periodo: 1 de octubre de 1940 al 30 de septiembre de 1941 (Buenos Aires: n.p., 1941), pp. 17-36.
48 Boletín de los deportes. Publicación ofi cial del comité organizador 1, (January 1941), p. 3.
49 Ibid.
415
An Account of Buenos Aires’ Efforts to Host the Olympic Games
50 See Juan Carlos Palacios to Avery Brundage, 16 September 1942, “Box 202,” Avery Brundage Collection.
51 Rock, Argentina, 1516-1987. From Spanish Colonization to Alfonsín, p. 262.
52 Raanan Rein, “‘El Primer Deportista’: The Political Use and Abuse of Sport in Peronist Argentina,” The 
International Journal of the History of Sport 15/2 (1998): p. 55. Analyses of Perón’s approach to sport 
can be found in Ariel Scher, La patria deportista (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1996), pp. 151-201; and Pablo 
Alabarces, Fútbol y patria. El fútbol y las narrativas de la nación en Argentina (Buenos Aires: Prometeo, 
2002), pp. 65-82. For accounts of Perón’s government see Rock, Argentina, 1516-1987. From Spanish Col-
onization to Alfonsín, pp. 262-319; Romero, A history of Argentina in the Twentieth Century, pp. 91-130; 
and Alejandro Horowicz, Los cuatro peronismos (Buenos Aires: Hyspamérica, 1986).
53 Ricardo S. de Bustamante and Emilio S. Delpech to Sigfrid Edstrøm, 20 January 1948; and Ricardo S. de 
Bustamante to Comité Internacional Olímpico, 21 January 1948, “JO Ete 1956. Correspondance Generale. 
1947-1949” (hereafter “JO Ete 1956”), IOC Archives.
54 Horacio Bustos Morón to International Olympic Committee, 28 January 1948, “JO Ete 1956,” IOC Archives.
55 Ricardo S. de Bustamante and Emilio S. Delpech to Sigfrid Edstrøm, 31 January 1948, “JO Ete 1956,” IOC 
Archives. See also Confederación Argentina de Deportes-Comité Olímpico Argentino, Memoria y bal-
ance general-inventario. Ejercicio: 1 de octubre de 1947 al 30 de septiembre de 1948 (Buenos Aires: n.p., 
1948), p. 28.
56 Confederación Argentina de Deportes-Comité Olímpico Argentino, Memoria y balance general-inven-
tario. Ejercicio: 1 de octubre de 1947 al 30 de septiembre de 1948, p. 28.
57 Confederación Argentina de Deportes-Comité Olímpico Argentino, Memoria. Balance general y cuenta 
de gastos y recursos. XXVIII ejercicio. 1 de octubre de 1948 al 30 de septiembre de 1949 (Buenos Aires: 
n.p., 1949), p. 22.
58 Ricardo C. Aldao and Horacio Bustos Morón to Sigfrid Edstrøm, 28 June 1948, “JO Ete 1956,” IOC Archives.
59 Ricardo C. Aldao and Horacio Bustos Morón to Colleagues and Friends of the International Olympic 
Committee, 28 June 1948, “JO Ete 1956,” IOC Archives.
60 Confederación Argentina de Deportes-Comité Olímpico Argentino, Memoria y balance general-inven-
tario. Ejercicio: 1 de octubre de 1947 al 30 de septiembre de 1948, pp. 22-28.
61 Quoted in Rein, “‘El Primer Deportista’: The Political Use and Abuse of Sport in Peronist Argentina,” p. 69.
62 Ibid, 56. In 1951 the Comité Olímpico Argentino modifi ed its bylaws establishing that the government 
would appoint the Comité’s President. 
63 Ricardo C. Aldao to Sigfrid Edstrøm, 20 December 1948, “Aldao,” IOC Archives.
64 Rodolfo G. Valenzuela and Santos Vicente Rossi to the International Olympic Committee, 5 March 1949, 
“JO Ete 1956,” IOC Archives.
65 Ciudad de Buenos Aires. República Argentina (Buenos Aires: n.p., 1956), n.p.
66 See the material in the folder “JO Ete 1956,” IOC Archives.
67 Otto Mayer to Comité Olímpico Argentino, 16 March 1949, “Argentine,” IOC Archives.
68 Comité Olímpico Uruguayo to Comité Olímpico Internacional, 19 April 1949, “JO Ete 1956,” IOC Ar-
chives.
69 Arnaldo Guinle to Sigfrid Edstrøm, 21 April 1949; Antônio Prado Jr. to Sigfrid Edstrøm, 23 April 1949; and 
José Ferreira Santos to Sigfrid Edstrøm, 27 April 1949, “JO Ete 1956,” IOC Archives.
70 Confederación Argentina de Deportes-Comité Olímpico Argentino, Memoria. Balance general y cuenta 
de gastos y recursos. XXVIII ejercicio. 1 de octubre de 1948 al 30 de septiembre de 1949, pp. 22-24.
416
Torres
71 Ibid., p. 24.
72 Ibid.
73 Horacio Bustos Morón to Otto Mayer, 25 November 1949, “JO Ete 1956,” IOC Archives.
74 See Santos V. Rossi to Sigfrid Edstrøm, 5 July 1949; Otto Mayer to Santos V. Rossi, 11 July 1949; and Otto 
Mayer to Comite Olympique Argentin, 24 May 1950, “Argentine,” IOC Archives.
75 Mensaje del Presidente de la Nación Argentina General Juan Perón al Inaugurar el 85º Periodo Ordinario 
de Sesiones del Honorable Congreso Nacional. Conceptos Doctrinarios (Buenos Aires: Presidencia de la 
Nación, 1951), p. 178. 
76 Horacio Bustos Morón to Sigfrid Edstrøm, 19 May 1951, “Bustos Moron, Horacio. Correspondance. 1931-
1952,” IOC Archives.
77 Rein, El Primer Deportista’: The Political Use and Abuse of Sport in Peronist Argentina, 54. See Rock, Ar-
gentina, 1516-1987. From Spanish Colonization to Alfonsín, 333-346; and Romero, A History of Argentina 
in the Twentieth Century, 131-171 for studies of the 1955-1966 period.
78 Avery Brundage to Enrique Alberdi, 28 April 1956, “Argentine,” IOC Archives.
79 Otto Mayer to Enrique Alberdi, 21 August 1956, “Argentine,” IOC Archives.
80 The government did not support some athletes who swore allegiance to Perón. For details of the govern-
ment’s action see the copious correspondence written by the IOC President, the IOC chancellor, the Ar-
gentine IOC members, and several Argentine Olympic offi cials in this regard in “Argentine,” IOC Archives.
81 José Oriani and Alberto P. Petrolini to Otto Mayer, 12 December 1961, “Argentine,” IOC Archives. Appar-
ently, Argentine IOC member Enrique C. Alberdi asked IOC authorization to apply for the 1968 Olympics in 
1959. See Buenos Aires aspira a los Juegos Olímpicos de 1968 (Buenos Aires: n.p., ca. August 1962), p. 53.
82 See Rock, Argentina, 1516-1987, pp. 333-343.
83 José Oriani and Alberto P. Petrolini to Avery Brundage, 15 June 1962, “JO Ete 1968. Correspondance 
Generale. 1957-1964,” (hereafter “JO Ete 1968”), IOC Archives. See also Hernán Giralt to Avery Brund-
age, 12 June 1962, “JO Ete 1968,” IOC Archives.
84 José Oriani and Alberto P. Petrolini to Avery Brundage, 15 June 1962, “JO Ete 1968,” IOC Archives. 
85 Ibid.
86 Buenos Aires aspira a los Juegos Olímpicos de 1968, p. 54.
87 Ibid., p. 55.
88 Jorge N. Parsons to Otto Mayer, 17 August 1962, “Argentine,” IOC Archives.
89 Martha J. McIntosh, “The Olympic Host City Bid Process: Facing Challenges and Making Changes,” in 
Blickpunkt Olympia: Entdeckungen, Erkenntnisse, Impulse = Focus on Olympism: Discoveries, Discussion, 
Directions, ed. Manfred Messing and Norbert Müller (Agon Sportverlag and Walla Walla Press: Kassel 
and Sydney, 2000), p. 313.
90 See Alberto Prebisch to Avery Brundage, 11 February 1963; José Oriani and Alberto P. Petrolini to Avery 
Brundage, 15 February 1963; and Replies to the Questionnaire to be Answered in Presenting Buenos Ai-
res as Site for the XIX Olympic Games 1968, “JO Ete 1968,” IOC Archives.
91 Arturo U. Illia to José Oriani, 14 August 1963, “JO Ete 1968,” IOC Archives.
92 José Oriani and Alberto P. Petrolini to the Members of the International Olympic Committee, 20 August 
1963, “JO Ete 1968,” IOC Archives. See Alberto Prebisch to the Members of the International Olympic 
Committee, 16 August 1963, “JO Ete 1968,” IOC Archives.
417
An Account of Buenos Aires’ Efforts to Host the Olympic Games
93 For an account of Menem’s years see Romero, A history of Argentina in the Twentieth Century, 285-317; 
and the essays in Steven Levitsky and Maria Victoria Murillo, eds., The Politics of Institutional Weakness. 
Argentine Democracy (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2005).
94 José Ignacio Lladós, “El sí que enciende la gran ilusión,” La Nación, 8 March 1997, http://www.lanacion 
.com.ar/64802 (accessed 15 July 2006). 
95 See Víctor Lupo, Historia política del deporte argentino,1610-2002 (Buenos Aires: Corregidor, 2004), p. 449.
96 “El precio de ser la sede,” La Nación, 5 March 1997, http://www.lanacion.com.ar/64641 (accessed 
15 July 2006).
97 The IOC has subsequently developed a two-stage process. Cities are fi rst “applicants” and only after pass-
ing an initial evaluation, they advance to the second stage and become “candidates.”
98 Buenos Aires 2004, 1, p. 12.
99 For a detailed description of the “Olympic corridor,” see The Best City for the Best Games (Buenos Aires: 
n.p., 1997), pp. 13-21.
100 La Nación, 21 February 1997, http://www.lanacion.com.ar/64013 (accessed 15 July 2006).
101 See for example the Monaco IOC member’s comments in La Nación, 17 July 1997, http://www.lanacio 
n.com.ar/72919 (accessed 15 July 2006).
102 See José Ignacio Lladós, “El ciclo olímpico de Buenos Aires,” La Nación, 15 June 2004, http://www.lana-
cion.com.ar/610340 (accessed 15 July 2006).
103 La Nación, 30 September 1997, http://www.lanacion.com.ar/77788 (accessed 15 July 2006). 
104 For an analysis of De la Rúa’s government, the causes of the crisis, and the crisis itself see Romero, A his-
tory of Argentina in the Twentieth Century, pp. 333-349.
105 La Nación, 26 January 2002, http://www.lanacion.com.ar/369410 (accessed 15 July 2006). 
106 Richard W. Pound, Inside the Olympics. A Behind-the-Scenes Look at the Politics, the Scandals, and the 
Glory of the Games (Etobicoke, Ontario: J. Wiley & Sons Canada, 2004), p. 201.
107 Ibid.
108 See Marcelo Garraffo’s, Aníbal Ibarra’s, and Hernán Lombardi’s, former sate secretary of sport, mayor of 
Buenos Aires and minister of tourism respectively, comments in La Nación, 14 October 2000, http://www.
lanacion.com.ar/36878; 15 June 2004, http://www.lanacion.com.ar/610340; 26 January 2002, http://www.
lanacion.com.ar/369410 (accessed 15 July 2006). Also see the last section of this presentation.
109 McIntosh, “The Olympic Host City Bid Process: Facing Challenges and Making Changes,” p. 313.
110 For the historical evolution and descriptions of Buenos Aires see, for example, David J. Keeling, Buenos 
Aires. Global Dreams, Local Crises (New York: John Wiley, 1996); James R. Scobie, Buenos Aires. Plaza to 
Suburb, 1870-1910 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974); Charles S. Sargent, The Spatial Evolution 
of Greater Buenos Aires, Argentina, 1870-1930 (Tempe: Arizona State University Press, 1974); and James 
Bruce, Those Perplexing Argentines (New York: Longman, Green & Co., 1953).
111 Rein, “‘El Primer Deportista’: The Political Use and Abuse of Sport in Peronist Argentina,” p. 56.
112 See Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Refl ections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism 
(London; Verso, 1991).
113 La Nación, 28 May 2006, http://www.lanacion.com.ar/809656 (accessed 15 July 2006). See also Clarín 
(Buenos Aires) (hereafter Clarín), 28 May 2006, http://www.clarin.com/diario/2006/05/28/deportes/d-
08703.htm (accessed 15 July 2006).
418
114 See Clarín, 28 May 2006, http://www.clarin.com/diario/2006/05/28/deportes/d-08703.htm; and http://w 
ww.clarin.com/diario/2006/05/28/deportes/d-08601.htm (accessed 15 July 2006).
115 Clarín, 28 May 2006, http://www.clarin.com/diario/2006/05/28/deportes/d-08703.htm (accessed 15 July 
2006). See also La Nación, 28 May 2006, http://www.lanacion.com.ar/809656 (accessed 15 July 2006).
116 Mariano Ryan, “Por ahora, imposible,” Clarín, 29 May 2006, http://www.clarin.com/diario/2006/05/29/ 
deportes/d-02601.htm (accessed 15 July 2006). The 2006 South American Games were originally award-
ed to La Paz, Bolivia. However, because of domestic instability in that country, in June 2005 this decision 
was declared void. In August of that year, Buenos Aires was elected to host the event.
117 After Buenos Aires and Bogotá, Colombia proved incapable of hosting the event, the 2002 South Ameri-
can Games were fi nally held in four Brazilian cities, Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, Curitiba and Belém.
118 Steven Levitsky and María Victoria Murillo, “Building Castles in the Sand? The Politics of Institutional Weakness 
in Argentina,” in Levitsky and Murillo, The Politics of Institutional Weakness. Argentine Democracy, p. 44.
119 Pound, Inside the Olympics, p. 200.
